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ABSTRACT. Rationalist analysis ofpolicymaking, exemplified by cost-benefit analysis,
ignores the variance in outcomes associated with policies and seeks to maximize expected
outcomes. Burkeans, by contrast, view policy outcome uncertainty negatively. The Burkean
approach is echoed in the precautionary principle, which argues that policies with hard-to-
determine or high-variance outcomes should be avoided. Both approaches are the subject of vast
literatures. This Article argues that both approaches are wrong. When policies can be reversed in
future periods, variation in the outcomes associated with a policy is a good thing. Reversibility
means that the downside risk of high-variance policies is limited; policies with unexpectedly bad
outcomes can be changed in the next period. The upside of high-variance policies, by contrast,
may last indefinitely, since policies with unexpectedly good outcomes will be retained. Thus,
when policies are reversible, policymakers should deliberately choose policies with uncertain
outcomes, other things equal. The Article also examines the assumption of policy reversibility. It
shows that the most important source of irreversibility for policy analysis is irretrievable "sunk
costs" rather than the potential for catastrophic outcomes or policy inertia. As a result, policies
are more reversible than commonly appreciated. The Article then examines optimal
policymaking under irreversibility. Under extreme irreversibility, conservatism of a particular
sort, called the "real options" approach, constitutes the best policy. More generally, the Article
argues that the appropriate attitude toward policy variance depends upon the reversibility of
policy. This analysis illuminates many puzzles in constitutional law and institutional design,
such as the puzzling difference between entrenched statutes, which are unconstitutional, and
sunset clauses, which are permitted. The Article concludes with recommendations to encourage
policymakers to use variance more effectively.
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Richard Brooks, Heather Gerken, Oona Hathaway, Alvin Klevorick, Daniel Markovits, Theodore
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LEARNING THROUGH POLICY VARIATION
INTRODUCTION
How should policymakers choose laws and regulations when outcomes are
uncertain? The answer initially seems simple: they should choose the best
policies-the ones with the highest average payoffs along some metric.
Burkeans have a different view. They are skeptical of human ability to divine
the best policies. Instead of encouraging policymakers to choose the policies
that seem best, Burkeans urge policymakers to choose policies that change the
status quo incrementally rather than drastically. When policymakers can learn
from the results of their laws and make changes, however, both the common
sense position-choose the best policy-and the Burkean position-choose
new policies cautiously and incrementally - are often wrong.
When learning is possible,' innovative high-risk policies with lower average
outcomes but the potential for greater outcomes become preferable.2 If a high-
risk policy proves a failure, then the policy can be changed, and the policy with
the highest average payoff can be pursued. If the policy succeeds, then
policymakers will have achieved an ideal outcome and will no longer need to
search for alternatives. Learning allows policymakers to limit the downside of a
high-risk policy but still enjoy the upside, making a high-risk policy with a
lower average payoff a better initial choice in many cases than a low-risk policy
with a higher average payoff.
In other words, policies serve two functions. Their primary function is to
achieve some outcome in the current period. But the information provided by
observing a policy's outcome also assists the search for better policies for the
1. "Learning" about policies refers to the process through which the variability in outcomes
associated with a policy is reduced. Before implementing a policy, policymakers may have
only a dim idea about the effects of the policy. After implementing the policy and observing
its effects, policymakers will often have a much better sense of the outcomes associated with
the policy in current and future periods. Thus, policymakers will have "learned" about the
policy and have a much greater ability to predict the policy's impacts. It may also be possible
to "learn" about a policy without trying it. For example, one can learn about untried
Policy A by extrapolating the effects of a similar but tested Policy B to Policy A. See infra Part
III. This form of learning necessarily will be inferior to directly learning about Policy A by
trying it.
2. See Martin L. Weitzman, Optimal Search for the Best Alternative, 47 ECONOMET1ICA 641
(1979) (developing the mathematical basis of the optimal search approach); see also Philippe
Aghion et al., Optimal Learning by Experimentation, 58 REv. ECON. STUD. 621, 642-43 (1991)
(same); Volker Wieland, Learning by Doing and the Value of Optimal Experimentation, 24 J.
ECON. DYNAMics & CONTROL 501, 513-19 (2000) (characterizing the process of
experimentation for economic agents, such as firms with unknown demand curves). This
Article examines public policymaking as an optimal search process -a novel perspective in
both the economics and legal literatures.
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future. And the best policy from a search perspective often differs from the best
policy for the current period. The "optimal search" for a policy seeks an
excellent policy that will enable policymakers to end the policy search. Thus,
optimal search theory favors high-variance policies, because variance increases
the probability of finding excellent policies. The average outcome of a policy
matters less from an optimal search perspective than the upside of a policy
because it is unlikely that a reasonable but suboptimal outcome will end the
search for a good policy. A bad policy, moreover, can be changed in the next
period.
The economics literature on optimal search focuses on the choice between
two new possibilities. Policymaking, however, often involves the choice
between a new policy and the status quo. Generally, new policies have higher
variance in outcomes than existing policies. The optimal search approach,
therefore, suggests that new policies should be implemented frequently. Even
when choosing between alternative untried policies, the policy with greater
variance is the better choice, other things equal.
The implications for public policymakers are wide ranging. Take contract
law, for example. A number of scholars have proposed complex rules that aim
to improve the status quo.3 Critics argue, however, that the efficiency of the
rules depends on questionable assumptions about individual behavior.4 Given
these defects, most of these proposals have never been tried. The optimal
search approach, however, suggests that these policies should be tested. If the
alternative default rules fail to improve social welfare,' then the policies can be
discarded. If the default rules succeed, however, then policymakers will have
achieved a significant, long-lasting improvement in the quality of law.
Corporate law involves similar disputes. It typically changes little, and
every proposed change is met by critics who praise the status quo. The critics
may be right that the status quo is better on average than are proposed
reforms, but the optimal search approach suggests that even if the critics are
right, new policies should be tried so long as they have some chance of
constituting a significant improvement over the status quo.
Reversible regulations provide a third area where the optimal search
approach illuminates policymaking. At present, debates on regulation are
between those who favor the cost-benefit approach, which advocates choosing
3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to
Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995).
5. Default rules may fail because the assumptions underlying their supposed desirability prove
faulty, or they may fail because of an unforeseen hindrance.
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the best law on average, and those who favor the precautionary principle,
which advocates caution in many regulatory choices. The best risk regulation
from an optimal search perspective constitutes a modification of cost-benefit
analysis that contrasts with the precautionary principle even more sharply than
conventional cost-benefit analysis.
The optimal search approach also buttresses the argument of those
advocating for policy experimentation at the state level and against wide-
ranging federal preemption of state laws. In a federalist system, policy variance
becomes even more desirable than in a national system as the learning benefits
of variance are shared through space as well as through time. While nationally
applicable policies will often maximize per-period outcomes, the preemption
that often accompanies these laws stifles learning through variation to a degree
underappreciated even by those who argue that states are the laboratories of
democracy. As a result, the optimal search approach favors extremely limited
preemption of state law.
While illuminating, the optimal search approach, which favors high-
variance policies, relies on a number of assumptions. It assumes that
policymakers can learn from their laws and that they can change these laws in
response to their learning. When policies have irreversible effects, the benefits
of variance in policies are greatly reduced. Indeed, when new policies are
irreversible, the dynamic analysis emphasized by the optimal search approach
indicates that variance is no longer positive, or even neutral, but rather
negative.6 Burkean approaches thus have continued salience for policymakers
when policy is examined in a dynamic context because Burkean approaches are
optimal when policies are irreversible. Similarly, expected-value maximization
rationalist approaches, which ignore variance, become more attractive for
policymakers when policies are sticky but reversible, as the learning benefits of
high variance and the flexibility benefits of low variance partially offset each
other. In total, the choice of optimal policies depends critically on policy
reversibility.
Policy reversibility has two sources. Some degree of irreversibility is
inherent in all policies, while other sources of irreversibility arise from
policymaking institutions. To gain the maximum benefits of the optimal search
approach, this Article recommends institutional mechanisms that maximize
6. This is generally known as the "real options" approach to decisionmaking under
uncertainty. For a comprehensive economic account, see AVINASH K. DIxIT & ROBERT S.
PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994). For legal applications, see IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005); and Cass R. Sunstein,
Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 862-64 (2006). Irreversibility and the
real options approach are discussed in detail in Part III.
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reversibility, such as sunset clauses, unicameral legislatures, and a reduced
emphasis on stare decisis.
In both federalist and uni-jurisdictional settings, the optimal search
approach assumes that policymakers aim to maximize social welfare. The
Article later relaxes this assumption and examines public policymakers'
incentives to innovate in uni-jurisdictional and federalist contexts. Because
policymakers' incentives to innovate are often lower than optimal in each
context, several recommendations, such as subsidizing federalist innovation or
emphasizing innovation in contexts with electoral insulation, may be justified.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I summarizes the Burkean,
classical liberal/rationalist, and "experimentalist" approaches to public
policymaking. Part II develops the optimal search perspective and
demonstrates that high-risk policies with relatively low average outcomes often
should be instituted before policies that other policymaking rationales classify
as superior. Additionally, Part II examines how this optimal search insight
relates to different variables, such as the choice of discount rates and the time
required to evaluate a policy. It also develops the optimal search approach
through idealized applications to risk regulation, contract law, corporate law,
and federalism.
The remaining Parts of the Article address impediments to learning
through policy variation via the optimal search process. Part III evaluates
Burkean and rationalist objections to the optimal search perspective and
discusses how the optimal search approach applies to policymaking and
institutional design when the effects of policy changes are irreversible. Part IV
relaxes the assumption that policymakers pursue socially beneficial policies and
examines the optimal search approach from a public choice perspective. Part V
reexamines the examples of the optimal search approach developed in Part II,
taking account of irreversible policy effects and imperfect political incentives
and modifying the approach's recommendations accordingly.
I. THEORIES OF PUBLIC POLICYMAKING
Classical liberals7 demonstrated a "faith in the capacity for human beings to
rationally reconstruct the laws and institutions of social life [and] to reform
7. This Part does not provide a full review of the political philosophies of classical liberals or
Burkeans. Rather, it briefly sketches their attitudes toward policymaking to demonstrate
how the optimal search approach relates to these two schools of thought. For an article
applying Burkean and liberal political philosophies to methods of legal interpretation, see
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REv. 619 (1994).
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and improve upon the ways of the past."8 With this faith in the ability of
reason to predict the effects of policies,9 policymaking for classical liberals
follows a straightforward logic: choose the best policy."0 For utilitarians, the
best policy is that which yields the greatest aggregate happiness or well-being."
Other metrics for the best policy are of course possible. Individuals concerned
with distribution, for example, might seek a policy that prioritizes the welfare
of the least well-off member of society. 2 Whatever the metric, the approach to
choosing policy remains the same: choose the policy that will produce the best
outcome under the given metric.
Edmund Burke rejected the liberals' faith in their ability to predict the
outcomes of policies. 3 He stated, "We are afraid to put men to live and trade
each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in
each man is small . ... "' Instead of relying on reason and abstract theory,
Burke emphasized tradition and past practice. Past practice has been tested. It
is a "deliberate election of ages and of generations; it is a Constitution made by
what is ten thousand times better than choice, it is made by the peculiar
circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social
habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of
8. RICHARD HUDELSON, MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 41 (1999).
9. If the impacts of a policy are uncertain, then reason should be able to predict the
probabilities of certain outcomes.
10. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,
61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434-35 (1953) (suggesting "a close affinity between the cardinal utility
concept of welfare economics and the cardinal utility concept of the theory of choices
involving risk [expected utility maximization]," thereby implying that policy decisions from
a welfarist perspective should maximize expected value or utility).
ii. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789)
(describing the "principle of utility" as "that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question").
12. See, e.g., JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. Some scholars argue that Burke was himself a classical liberal along many dimensions.
Others claim that his reverence for tradition precluded his being a liberal. For a discussion of
Burke's work, see CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY
AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND BURKE 605-18 (1992). For an application of
Burke's views to judicial decisionmaking, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 1O5
MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); and Young, supra note 7. The discussion of Burke's thoughts in
these articles influenced this Part.
14. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790).
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time."'" Burke was therefore an empiricist, preferring data about the
effectiveness of policies rather than theoretical predictions.
Burke disliked radical change, which in his view is based on imperfect
reason rather than experience: "Men little think how immorally they act in
rashly meddling with what they do not understand.', 6 Burke did not reject all
change, however. He favored incremental change, with each step evaluated
empirically before the next step is taken. Burke wrote,
By a slow but well sustained progress, the effect of each step is
watched; the good or ill success of the first gives light to us in the
second; and so, from light to light, we are conducted with safety
through the whole series. We see that the parts of the system do not
clash. The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are provided
for as they arise .... We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are
enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anomalies and
contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs of men.7
Burke's recommendation for choosing policies therefore differs from the
classical liberal approach. Burke argues that a new policy that is expected to
yield benefits to society should not be implemented in its entirety immediately.
Instead, Burke argues that a portion of the policy should be implemented and
then evaluated. If the reform appears successful, then an additional element of
the policy should be implemented. This process should continue until some
element of the policy either fails or the entire policy reform is implemented."
The differences between the classical liberal/rationalist approach to
policymaking and the Burkean/conservative approach to policymaking can be
seen below in Example 1. Suppose that policymakers must choose between
existing Policy A and new Policy B. Policy A costs nothing to implement and
15. Edmund Burke, Speech on the Reform of the Representation of the Commons in
Parliament (May 7, 1782), in 4 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE: MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS 15, 21 (E.J. Payne ed., 199o).
16. EDMUND BURKE, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS 113 (London, J. Dodsley
1791). In this account, the value of past practice is very much empirical. Past practice has
worked and is therefore owed deference. There are other values associated with Burke's
fealty to tradition, of course. For a comprehensive discussion, see Anthony T. Kronman,
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
17. BURKE, supra note 14, at 143-44.
18. If some part of a policy reform fails, then policymakers should either return to the old status
quo, or - if a partial reform yields better outcomes than the old status quo - maintain the
partially reformed policy as a new status quo.
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yields social benefits of $50 per period. Policy B is more innovative and costs
$20 to implement. It yields benefits of $120 per period with a probability of o.6
and benefits of $o with a probability of 0.4. While these examples use dollars
to measure benefits for ease of exposition, it is important to remember that the
true benefits are measured in terms of aggregate welfare. 9 Only if social
outcomes can be measured according to Kaldor-Hicks utility terms can dollar




perid $50 $72 = o.6($120) + 0.4($o)
A rationalist prefers B to A in this example. Policy B provides an expected
benefit of $72 and an expected cost of $20, for a net benefit of $52. This is
greater than Policy A's net benefit of $5o. Policy B produces a greater expected
benefit than Policy A, so B should be chosen.
A Burkean, however, would probably prefer A to B. The Burkean would
suppose that the expected benefits of the untested Policy B are nearly
impossible to estimate through rational analysis. Furthermore, the downside
risk of untested Policy B is likely to be underestimated. Past practice (Policy A)
may illustrate some ill-defined but nonetheless important public preferences
that policymakers may be unable to pinpoint. Therefore, the negative
19. These benefits and costs can be quantified by any social welfare metric. For example, the
benefits in dollars may measure the dollar benefits to the least well-off member of society (a
social welfare function advocated by John Rawls) rather than measuring total wealth. More
generally, the benefits and costs could account for risk aversion in a rationalist framework,
as expected utility theory does within economic science. This would make the Burkean and
rationalist frameworks more similar to each other, although Burke would presumably doubt
the ability of the rationalist to appropriately measure risk aversion. Throughout this Article,
I generally adopt a utilitarian framework.
2o. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency proposes that a more socially efficient outcome can be reached by
moving from the Pareto optimal level if those who would be made better off by the outcome
compensate those who would be made worse off by the outcome. For a useful discussion of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further, too YALE L.J. 1211 (1991).
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consequences of changing A -and no longer reflecting public preferences for
past practice -may be more significant than the rationalist would suppose. In
light of this overlooked downside, the potential net gain from choosing Policy
B ($2 in this period) is simply not worth the risk.2
The Burkean conservative would not necessarily shun every new policy.
Consider Policy A' that is very similar to A but one step in the direction of
Policy B. A' has no cost of implementation, a o.6 chance of yielding benefits of
$52, and a 0.4 chance of yielding benefits of $49. A' would probably be
preferred to A under the Burkean framework. Policy A'would be implemented.
If it succeeded, then Burkeans would contend that A", which is another step in
the direction of B, should also be implemented. In this way, Burkeans hope to
attain the possible benefits of Policy B, without incurring the downside risks
that accompany drastic policy changes.
Rationalist/liberals have identified several critiques of the Burkean
position.2" They question the assumption that Policy A is necessarily wise
because it has been tried. If experts believe that an untried position- like B is
better, then the rationalists see no reason to delay implementation out of
respect for the traditional Policy A. First, there is no guarantee that
incrementally different policies like A' and A" exist-some policies simply
cannot be adopted piecemeal. When this is the case, Burkean conservatism will
often lead to inferior outcomes. Policy B has a higher expected value than
Policy A, but the Burkean will continue to favor A. Second, even if such policies
exist, the Burkean approach is inferior because it takes a considerable number
of periods to yield B's benefits; Burkean reform is purposefully deliberate,
which is detrimental if reform is warranted.
Another strain of policymaking theory that is closely related to the
approach developed in this Article emphasizes pragmatic learning,
experimentalism, and dynamic decisionmaking. 3 This emphasis occurs most
21. An extremely risk-averse classical liberal might advocate cautious policymaking approaches
that conform with the Burkean approach. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the
sources of caution. For the liberal, caution is a product of a risk-averse response to a
probability distribution of different policy outcomes. For the Burkean, caution is warranted
by the tendency to underestimate the probability of bad outcomes.
22. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory 11-12 (Harvard Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Theory, Working Paper No. o8-02, 20o8), available at
http ://ssrn.com/abstract=1o87017.
23. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning
Experience, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 791 (1994); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering
in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 555. For a review of this literature, see Orly
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frequently in environmental policy analysis. Daniel Farber sums up this
attitude as follows: "Rather than viewing [environmental] policy making as a
one-shot exercise, in which the goal is to adopt the optimum solution based on
current information, we might do better to think of a continuous process of
learning and experimentation."'
"Experimentalists" such as Farber, Charles Sabel, and Michael Dorf
typically extol the virtues of federalism (and of other forms of decentralized
decisionmaking) because of its learning benefits."s In addition, scholars who
examine environmental decisionmaldng from a dynamic context often stress
the value of delaying high-variance innovative decisionmaking to await future
knowledge.26 Thus, the dynamic decision-making context is often used to
justify Burkean-type precautions in environmental contexts.27
With this extremely brief sketch of various approaches to policymaking as a
background, I present an approach to policymaking-the optimal search
approach -that combines elements of rationalism, Burkean conservatism, and
experimentalism to generate some initially counterintuitive results about the
desirability of certain policies.
II. CHOOSING POLICIES FROM AN OPTIMAL SEARCH PERSPECTIVE:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
Policies and their effects are not static.28 A policy's performance in one
period yields information about its probable performance in the next period. In
fact, it would be surprising if this information had no bearing on the
probability of the policy continuing in future periods. In other words, policies
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004).
24. Farber, supra note 23, at 791.
25. For a thorough examination of experimentalism in a federalist system, see infra Subsection
II.C.4.
26. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 23, at 803 ("If a decision has irreparable consequences, then it
may be worth delaying the decision in order to obtain new information. Taking an
irreversible step forecloses the possibility of future learning, and therefore incurs an extra
cost that does not show up in the usual cost-benefit analysis. In a formal sense waiting is
equivalent to purchasing an option contract, and under many circumstances that option has
positive value." (footnote omitted)). For a detailed discussion, see infra Section III.C.
27. For example, when new policies are irreversible and the outcome of B can be determined
without actually implementing B, dynamic analysis suggests that policy A is preferred to
policy B. See Sunstein, supra note 6; infra Part III.
28. Even if there is policy inertia, policies are not set in stone. For a detailed discussion, see infra
Part III.
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are not chosen and then simply retained. Picking an optimal policy entails
choosing a policy in one period and then reoptimizing the policy in a future
period given the additional information obtained since the prior policy
decision. When accounting for reoptimization, policy choices might be very
different than they would be absent reoptimization. Instead of choosing the
best policy for the present, policymakers must balance the choice between good
policies in the current period with the ability of this period's policy choice to
improve future policy choices. If a current policy is expected to be bad, but
potentially improves the future policy choice set, then it may be a better choice
than a policy that has high expected value in the current period but adds little
to the menu of options in the future.
A. The Theory of Optimal Search
The experimentalists described in Part I develop elaborate systems of
decentralized decisionmaking to foster dynamic learning.29 Here, I take a
different approach. I aim to normatively characterize optimal policymaking
under a number of different conditions. I develop the optimal search approach
to be applied when policies have reversible effects and learning is possible. The
optimal search approach values high-variance policies to a much greater degree
than static rationalism or Burkean conservatism.
In other words, static rationalism advocates choosing the policy with the
highest expected value, ignoring the variance of the policy. Burkean
conservatism warns against policies with considerable variance and encourages
incremental policy change. Dynamic experimentalists provide few normative
recommendations about the content of policy, focusing instead on the
organizational setting in which policy is made.
The optimal search approach, by contrast, insists that high variance is a
valuable feature of a policy. High-variance policies offer the potential to find
excellent policies for future periods. Therefore, high-variance policies will be
better choices than low-variance policies of the same or (even higher) expected
value whenever changing policies is a feasible possibility.
The optimal search approach constitutes a modification of the rationalist
approach. When policies can be changed without imposing irreversible effects
and learning is possible, the optimal search approach produces the best policy
29. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 23, at 314 (advocating the "construct[ion of] the
organizational rudiments of local, or, rather, subnational, pragmatist government, by
transposing to the public sphere the institutions of benchmarking, simultaneous
engineering, and error detection").
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for rationalists. Put simply, the optimal search approach emphasizes how the
rational policy calculus changes with learning and reoptimization.
These insights are illustrated by modifying the hypothetical policy decision
presented in Example i. Suppose that a policymaker faces a choice between two
policies with uncertain values but with known distributions of potential
payoffs.3 The policies must be implemented to resolve the uncertainty
regarding their efficacy and to determine the policy payoff per period, which
can be represented by v. Suppose that the policy must be tested for a year (the
length of a period) and that the annual discount rate is ten percent.3' Any
policy has a cost, c, of implementation. This cost represents the cost to society
of adjusting and implementing a policy. Suppose further that once a policy has
been implemented, it is costless to return to that policy in a future period.32 In
other words, in each period a policymaker has the option of choosing any
previously tested policy or a new policy at some positive switching cost.
Consider the choice between two policies, A and B, summarized in the table
for Example 2. Policy A is a relatively safe policy because it has been attempted
before.33 Policy A costs nothing to implement (c = o), and yields social benefits
of $5o per period (v = 5o). Policy B is a more innovative policy and costs $20 to
implement.34 It yields benefits of $120 per period with a probability of 0.2 and
benefits of $o with a probability of o.8.
3o. This example parallels the one found in Weitzman, supra note 2, at 641-43.
31. None of the results in this Article depends upon these assumptions, and they will be relaxed
or altered in subsequent Sections.
32. This assumption is obviously too strong. For many reasons, including the political system
and status quo bias, the existing policy is cheapest and easiest to implement in the next
period. Previously implemented policies are the next cheapest, and brand new policies are
presumably the most expensive. The consequences of the policy inertia that is imposed by
this distribution of implementation costs are discussed in detail in Part III.
33. Alternatively, Policy A may be a very low-risk policy that has not been implemented before.
34. One might ask why Policy B has never been attempted before. There are several responses.
One answer may be that Policy B had never been thought of before. A second may be that
there has been some potentially permanent change in the environment that changes the
payoff distribution of Policy B, making Policy B an essentially new policy.
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aExamle 2
Cost $o $20
ExpectedBeneit per $50 $24 = o.2($120)+o.8($o)
Period
The choice may seem obvious: Policy A is better than Policy B. Policy A has
a considerably higher expected social benefit per period ($5o > $24) and lower
cost ($0 < $20) than Policy B, making A preferable to the rationalist/liberal.
Policy A also entails no risk, while Policy B is quite risky, making A preferable
from the Burkean/conservative position. Indeed, one might be skeptical of any
legal theory that advocates Policy B when the choice between A and B appears
so lopsided. Yet the optimal search theory of policy decisions indicates that B
should be tried before A.
Consider first the payoff for choosing Policy A. If one chooses Policy A in
this period, one should choose it in every period. Because there is no
uncertainty resolved by choosing A, the information set of the policymaker
who chooses A in this period will be the same in the next period. Therefore, if
A is preferred in this period, then it must also be preferred in the next period.




Now consider the expected payoff in all periods in the future from trying B.
The expected payoff is as follows. By choosing Policy B, society incurs a cost of
$20. With a probability of 0.2, the policy succeeds and yields its benefits into
the indefinite future. With a probability of o.8, Policy B fails and yields no
benefits this period. If Policy B fails, the policymaker should change policies to
Policy A. Policy A's value is as given above, though it is discounted because it
arrives one period later. The expected lifetime payoff from choosing Policy B in
this period is therefore
+ ]o$585$8o
-20+0.2 [$12+ ]+o8[o + 50 $585.82
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The expected payoff from Policy B exceeds the benefit of Policy A, even though
B appears inferior to Policy A along every possible dimension.
So why does B "beat" A? There is a difference between determining the
best policy and choosing the policy to attempt first. When choosing the policy
to attempt first, policymakers must consider not only the expected benefits and
costs of the policy in the current period, but also the potential for realizing an
extremely good policy that can be continued in future periods. Even though A
performs better than B on average, B offers the potential for a much better
outcome than A. Therefore, B should be tried first even though there is a high
likelihood that B will fail.3" If B works; then policymakers have found an
excellent policy and will retain B. If B fails, then policymakers choose A for the
remaining periods. 36
B. Factors Influencing the Optimal Degree of Policy Variance
The relative desirability of B as compared to A depends upon the values of
a number of variables. First, it should be emphasized that the average
outcomes of B and A matter, even though they are not determinative. While
the values of B and A in the search program for an optimal policy depend
primarily on their upsides, the opportunity costs of implementing B and A for
the current period depend upon their average outcomes. As B's average
outcome deteriorates, B becomes less desirable relative to A, even when
holding B's upside constant.
Second, high implementation costs reduce the desirability of high-variance
policy innovations such as B. For example, suppose the costs of implementing
B are $20o rather than $2o because the costs of educating the population about
the new policy are extremely high. In this case, Policy A becomes more
desirable than Policy B - some policy changes are simply not worth the
switching costs. Note, however, that this altered example requires switching
costs to be over forty percent of the infinite real effects of the policy. While
some policies might have such high switching costs, other policies' switching
costs do not rise to such a high proportion of total effects. In particular,
important policies are likely to have proportionately lower switching costs.
3s. Throughout the remainder of this Article, terms like "B being better than A" or "B beating
A" will mean that B should be chosen before A. At no point do I mean to suggest that B is
better than A in every period; I suggest only that B should be chosen first under many
circumstances in spite of its inferiority in expected-value terms.
36. For a rigorous proof of this argument, see Weitzman, supra note 2.
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Third, high-risk policies such as B become more desirable relative to low-
risk policies like A when the discount rate is lower-that is, when the future
becomes more important relative to the present. Policy B's value lies primarily
in the upside policy potential that might be enjoyed in future periods. When
discount rates are low, this value is discounted to a lesser extent. Therefore,
Policy B's value rises relative to Policy A. Suppose that the discount rate were
o.o5 in our example rather than o.1. In this case, the value of choosing Policy A
becomes $1ooo, while the value of choosing Policy B becomes $1225.82. The
difference in value between choosing B and choosing A grows from about $86
to $226.
Fourth, Policy B becomes more attractive when the probability of its
success is correlated with the probability of other policies' success. If B's
success or failure tells us information about policies C, D, and E, then B
becomes increasingly attractive. Not only does implementing B first provide
information about B's potential in future periods, it also provides information
about the value of using C, D, and E in the future. In other words, B provides
substantial information to facilitate the policy search. The value of this
information should be added to the value of choosing B first when deciding
whether to implement B.
Fifth, Policy B becomes less attractive when it takes longer to evaluate. If
Policy B takes two periods to evaluate, then its low expected value will be felt
for more than one period. Consider the value of Policy B if it must be in effect
for four periods before it can be evaluated. The expected value of choosing
Policy B first thereby becomes
$120 -$50
-20+o.2[ (+. ]+o.8 [o+o+o+o+ o 1 $495.06
Policy B should not be tried before Policy A when Policy B requires four or
more periods to evaluate, in spite of the potential for an excellent outcome
under Policy B. The low expected value of Policy B for the first four periods
trumps the high upside of Policy B."
Sixth, the optimal search approach does not imply that innovative policies
should always be chosen. Suppose Policy B is chosen in this period and proves
to work. In this case, the search for an effective policy comes to an end; the
37. This hypothetical is further examined in Section III.C.
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costs of continuing to search are not worth the benefits because an effective
policy has been found. Thus, the optimal search approach does not require
policy innovation. It merely points out that innovation has long-run benefits
that are not captured by the expected outcome of the innovation.
The superiority of B to A is subject to a number of critiques that will be
explored in detail in Sections III.A and III.B. Before examining these
complications, the next Section will examine the usefulness of the optimal
search approach in debates about risk regulation, contract law, corporate law,
and federalism.
C. The Optimal Search Approach: Applications
This Section examines how the optimal search approach might be applied
in some important contexts. It is important to emphasize, however, that none
of the following examples constitutes a comprehensive case study. Indeed, each
application developed in this Section does not address many impediments to a
full implementation of the optimal search perspective. 38 Instead of exhaustively
describing how policymaking decisions should be made, these applications are
intended to illustrate the potential value of adding an optimal search calculus to
the existing criteria for choosing policies.
1. Choosing Between Reversible Regulations
The optimal search approach illuminates some of the debates regarding
reversible risk regulation.39 Reversible risks are risks that, if and when they
materialize, are confined to one period. Two approaches - cost-benefit analysis
and the precautionary principle -frame most discussions of risk regulation.4"
It should be emphasized at the outset of this Subsection that the debate
between the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis is most salient
when risks are irreversible-a situation that will be discussed below.
Nevertheless, many risks are not irreversible and thus are conducive to analysis
via the optimal search approach.
41
38. Some of the most important complications are examined in Part III.
39. The problem of irreversible risks is discussed in detail in Part III.
40. See Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs 3-4
(Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-023, 20o6),
available at http ://ssrn.con/abstract= 927995.
41. Cost-benefit analysis does not obviously distinguish between reversible and irreversible
risks. In addition, "some formulations [of the precautionary principle] ... apply to even
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Cost-benefit analysis sums the costs and benefits of different policies and
instructs that the policy with the greatest net benefit should be chosen. In this
regard, the intellectual underpinnings of cost-benefit analysis lie in the classical
liberal/rationalist approach to policy. Cost-benefit analysis recognizes that the
actual effects of many policies are uncertain. The response of cost-benefit
analysis is to use expected values. The expected value of a policy is calculated
by multiplying the value of an outcome by the probability of its occurrence for
each possible outcome, and then summing up the resulting products.42 The
policy with the highest net expected value is the one preferred by cost-benefit
analysis.
The precautionary principle "seeks to trigger an incremental process of risk
regulation through the simple admonition, 'When an activity raises threats of
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established.' 43
The precautionary principle's intellectual foundations are very similar to those
of Burkean conservatism in that they emphasize the inability of rational science
to properly anticipate the effects of changes in the environment. 44
theoretically reversible risks." David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1315-16 (2003).
42. See Amartya Sen, Discipline of Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931 (2000).
43. Kysar, supra note 40, at 3-4 (quoting Peter Montague, The Precautionary Principle, RACHEL'S
ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 19, 1998, at 1, but mistranscribing "cause and effect" as
"cause-and-effect"). Note that there are many different articulations of the precautionary
principle. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 848-50. The one stated here is merely one oft-
cited statement of the principle. A full characterization of the precautionary principle or of
cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
44. See C.A. BowERs, MINDFUL CONSERVATISM: RETHINKING THE IDEOLOGICAL AND
EDUCATIONAL BASIS OF AN ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 91-94 (2003) (drawing a
link between environmental conservation and Burke's approach). Curiously, while legal
scholars have spilled considerable ink on the precautionary principle (a search in Westlaw's
Journals and Law Reviews database for ["precautionary principle"] on October 31, 2008
yielded over 210o documents) and on Burke (a search in Westlaw's Journals and Law
Reviews database for [Edmund /5 Burke!] on October 31, 2008 yielded over 1400
documents), they have not explored the seemingly obvious linkage between Burkean
political philosophy and the precautionary principle. A search in Westlaw's Journals and
Law Reviews database for ["precautionary principle" /5o Burke!] on October 31, 2008
yielded only six documents, five of which are related to a different Burke and the last of
which makes only a casual allusion to the similarity between the precautionary principle and
Burkean conservatism. See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and
Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289, 305-06 n.9o. It is important to note that
Westlaw's Journals and Law Reviews database neither catalogues all volumes of currently
published law journals, nor includes scholarship in non-law disciplines.
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Consider how these two approaches would examine the choice between
Policies A and B described in Example 2. Suppose that Policy A would
implement an existing technology approved by regulators and that Policy B
would implement a new technology for reducing a pollutant. Regulators must
consider whether to permit the new technology implemented by Policy B. The
B technology may do a better job of eliminating the pollutant than the existing
A technology, but it will probably do an inferior job. Permitting the B
technology is expensive because it requires issuance of new regulations and
installation of the new technology. Suppose further that the pollutant's harms
are felt in this period only, that the harms of the pollutant affected by the
technology are well known, and that the technology can be properly tested only
by approving it for use.
. Simple cost-benefit analysis- ignoring informational or learning value and
simply taking the expected per-period value of each technology -makes the
choice between A and B an easy one. Permitting the B technology entails a
higher cost ($20 for B versus $o for A) than the old technology45 and a lower
expected benefit46 ($24 of pollution reduction for B versus $50 of pollution
reduction for A). The net benefits of A are higher than B. Therefore Policy A -
favoring the status quo technology - should be chosen.
The precautionary principle also favors Policy A. Policy B "raises threats of
harm to human health" 47-in 8o% of cases Policy B does a poorer job of
reducing pollutants than Policy A. Policy B is less incremental than Policy A.
Policy B entails trying a new technology, a nonincremental maneuver, while
Policy A involves no alteration of population risk. Therefore, the precautionary
principle dictates that Policy A be chosen, particularly in light of the fact that
the Policy B technology appears inferior along a number of dimensions,
including expected benefits. When learning is possible, both per-period cost-
benefit analysis and the precautionary principle produce inferior outcomes
relative to the optimal search approach. Regulators should choose Policy B
because of its potential to produce an excellent outcome over the long run.
The optimal search approach constitutes a modification of traditional cost-
benefit analysis. Instead of taking expected values of various regulations and
choosing the policy with the highest expected value (implicitly assuming that
the policy will continue indefinitely), policymakers should conduct cost-benefit
analysis in a dynamic context where learning is possible. In this context, not
45. Both issuing new regulations and allowing some polluters to change their technology for
pollution reduction entail costs.
46. The benefits of either technology are realized in the form of reduced pollution.
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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only the per-period expected value, but also its distribution across periods,
matters. A long-run cost-benefit analysis, including all periods and the
possibility of switching policies after learning about the impact of policies, may
favor a policy that has low expected value but a wide distribution (such as
Policy B) over a policy that appears better along many dimensions.
Executive Order 12,866 requires cost-benefit assessment of agencies'
regulatory actions. 8 The Office of Management and Budget's Circular No. A-4
sets guidelines governing this cost-benefit analysis.49 The benefit estimates
required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) do not place a value
on the information provided by a particular regulation.50 Instead, they measure
only the direct benefits of a regulation, such as the amount of pollution
reduction. The informational value of a regulation might be large in relation to
the direct benefits. For example, Policy B provides expected benefits of only
$24 per period, but learning that B works better than expected allows us to
gain B's benefits in all future periods. Policy A, by contrast, provides no
valuable information. This informational value can be estimated as the
difference between B's upside and A's upside. Over the long run, this
difference in value is considerable. Indeed, in our example it is enough to
overcome A's superiority in the average case (see Example 2). B makes better
use of resources than A, despite A's seeming superiority. By requiring that
agencies place a value on the information provided by a regulation through the
use of dynamic reoptimization models rather than assuming that the proposed
regulation will be enacted indefinitely, the OMB could achieve better "resource
allocation.""s The optimal search approach turns the precautionary principle
applied to reversible risks on its head. 2 The precautionary principle advocates
the avoidance of risk; the optimal search approach seeks it out. The ability to
change policies limits the costs of high-variance policies in the optimal search
approach. If a regulation proves to be a bad one (the downside risk is realized),
48. Exec. Order No. 12,866§ 6(a)(3)(c), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi (2000).
49. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/aoo4/a-4.pdf.
5o. The OMB Circular makes no mention of measuring the information benefit estimates of a
particular regulation under its guidelines. Id.
s. Id. at 1.
52. The precautionary principle often assumes that probabilities cannot be estimated, a
condition called uncertainty. See Kysar, supra note 40, at 10-12. So long as the risks involved
are not irreversible, uncertainty does not require drastic changes in the lessons of the
optimal search approach. With uncertain but reversible risks, one can assume the worst-
that is, place heavy probability on bad outcomes -and still favor risky policies, rather than
safe ones.
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it can be changed. Therefore, reversible but risky regulations have a downside
limited to one period but an upside that can be realized indefinitely, making
risk relatively attractive in this context.
One critique of standard cost-benefit analysis focuses on its use of high
discount rates to discount the future and its sensitivity to the choice of discount
rate. 3 At least one critic has considered the possibility of a discount rate of
zero.54 These critics' arguments complicate the case for ordinary cost-benefit
analysis but add heft to the argument for choosing high-variance reversible
regulations under the optimal search approach. If the discount rate is zero, for
example, then the value of the upside of Policy B's technology grows. This high
upside will be realized in all future periods in which B proves to be a success.
The less these future periods are discounted, the more emphasis should be
placed on the option value of the technology. If there is no discounting, then
Policy B becomes an almost necessary choice. The possibility of enjoying lower
risks to health in an infinite number of undiscounted future periods trumps the
small increase in risk associated with the B technology in the current period.
2. The Optimal Search Approach and Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law
Economic analysis of contract law seeks to provide default rules that
maximize contractual surplus."5 One purpose of contractual defaults is to save
"parties the time, trouble, and risk of error implicit in crafting their own
contract terms. '', 6 Thus, many scholars advocate "majoritarian" default rules,
in which policymakers choose the default rule that would be chosen by most
parties considering an issue. These rules save the greatest number of parties the
cost of drafting a precise contract.
In separate articles, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner17 and Lucian Bebchuk
and Steven Shavell ss have developed a different rationale for policymakers'
choice of default rules. In some cases, default rules should not be majoritarian
but rather information forcing. An information-forcing rule compels parties
53. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2043-56
(1998).
54. See id.
55. See ROBERT E. SCOTT &JODY S. KRAus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 26-27 (4 th ed. 2007).
56. Id. at 9o .
57. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
58. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract: The Rule ofHadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).
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with superior information to divulge this information because the default rule,
which would apply if the party did not divulge this information, is crafted to
work against the party with the superior information.
Much of the development of the perspective favoring information-forcing
rules concerns the celebrated case of Hadley v. Baxendale.s9 Hadley developed
the rule that promisors are not liable for consequential damages caused by their
breaches of contract. Ayres and Gertner and Bebchuk and Shavell argue that
there is no indication that most parties would prefer the Hadley rule, making
Hadley nonmajoritarian. Instead, they claim that Hadley constitutes an
information-forcing rule.6' Promisees possess better information than
promisors regarding the probability of consequential damages. The Hadley rule
limiting consequential damages forces a promisee facing substantial
consequential damages (a "high type") to reveal this information to a
promisor. If the promisee does not reveal this information, then the promisor
will take ordinary precautions, secure in the knowledge that the Hadley rule
protects against unusually large consequential damages. Under certain
conditions, high consequential damages promisees reveal their "type," while
low consequential damages promisees ("low types") remain silent. Promisors
take the right precautions for each type, without having to go through the
trouble of investigating the potential consequential damages for every
promisee. If there are more low types than high types and communication
costs are sufficiently low, the Hadley information-forcing rule produces the
most efficient outcome.
By demonstrating that the "majoritarian" default rule paradigm is
sometimes inferior, the information-forcing or "penalty" default rule literature
constituted a major advance in contract law scholarship. From a policy
perspective, however, information-forcing rules have fared less well. 6' The
problem is simple: information-forcing rules trump majoritarian rules under
59. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 14S; see Barry E. Adler, The Questionable
Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1547-48 (1999). Following the
literature, this discussion will emphasize the Hadley rule. The same conclusions apply to
other information-forcing or penalty default rules.
6o. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note S7, at 112-15; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note s8, at 308. Even
if the Hadley rule would be the choice of most parties considering the rule, the rule was not
chosen for this reason.
61. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 57, at 1o6-07.
62. See Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. RMV.
563 (2006) (arguing that penalty default rules do not exist in practice). But see Ian Ayres,
Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 589 (2006)
(contradicting Posner's assertions and claiming that there are many examples of penalty
default rules).
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some assumptions, but they fall short under others. First, if communication
costs prevent promisors from communicating their types to promisees, then
the Hadley rule falters -it induces promisors to take precautions assuming that
damages will be low, even though there are some high-damage promisees who
cannot indicate their type.63 Similarly, if no one knows about a penalty default
rule, then the rule cannot serve its information-forcing function. In the case of
ignorance, a majoritarian rule that gives most parties their desired rule is
preferable.
More generally, the Hadley rule's efficiency depends on its ability to induce
a "separating equilibrium," wherein promisors know each promisee's type.64
An alternative equilibrium is a "pooling equilibrium," wherein promisees are
undifferentiated. 6, In a pooling equilibrium, the information-forcing rule fails
to force information. The Hadley rule results in a pooling equilibrium under
many conditions, including high communication costs as well as a continuous
distribution of types, rather than the discrete "high type/low type" framework
of the seminal Hadley models. Whenever the Hadley rule fails to induce
separation, the majoritarian rule eclipses the information-forcing rule. Unlike
an information-forcing rule, the majoritarian rule ensures that most parties in
an undifferentiated pooling equilibrium enjoy their preferred rule.
66
Second, the Hadley rule's efficiency hinges on the relative percentages of
high and low types. If there are more high types than low types, then the
Hadley rule forces considerable amounts of costly information sharing. By
contrast, a consequential damages rule might induce low types to agree to a
contractual consequential damages limitation. When there are fewer low types
than high types, the consequential damages rule achieves the same result as the
Hadley rule-the right precautions for each type-while economizing on
communication costs. In sum, the Hadley rule's efficiency depends upon a
number of hard-to-verify assumptions, making "an accurate evaluation of a
penalty-default rule's efficacy in the Hadley setting ... a heroic task.
6
,
In the face of uncertainty about whether a penalty rule will serve its desired
information-forcing function, a policymaker considering a penalty default rule
faces the following calculus. Under some conditions, the penalty default rule
enhances efficiency by forcing information sharing. Under other conditions,
63. See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 58, at 302 proposition 6(b) (demonstrating the
inefficiency of the Hadley rule when communication between parties is undesirable).
64. See Adler, supra note 59, at 1547-48.
65. Id. at 1556.
66. See id. at 1559-70.
67. Id. at 1552.
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such as ignorance of the penalty, the penalty default rule leaves many parties
with an undesirable rule. A majoritarian rule, by contrast, has a more limited
downside and upside. Even though the majoritarian rule does not force
efficient information sharing, the policymaker can at least be certain that the
rule gives most parties their desired rule. A majoritarian rule entails less risk
than a penalty rule and may well provide a better average outcome than a
penalty rule.
The majoritarian rule entails even less risk when it is the existing default
rule.68 Not only does the majoritarian rule reduce risk by granting most parties
what they want, the majoritarian rule also has the advantage of being tried and
true-its hidden deficiencies have been revealed by practice. Given these
realities, it may therefore come as no surprise that some scholars argue that
"there is no such thing as a penalty default rule. ''6,
The optimal search approach, however, suggests that penalty default rules
may be more desirable than generally realized. Returning to the example
above, a majoritarian rule corresponds to Policy A in the example -it is low
risk, but with no potential for information sharing. A penalty default rule
corresponds to Policy B. Penalty default rules are riskier than majoritarian rules
but provide some chance of genuinely superior outcomes in at least some
contexts. 7' The example demonstrates that, in some cases, penalty default rules
(corresponding to Policy B) should be implemented before majoritarian rules,
even if these majoritarian rules provide better average outcomes per period.
Penalty defaults provide the potential for continuing with an effective
information-forcing Policy B in future periods. The value of this upside
potential to future periods may well be great enough to indicate that the
penalty rule should be tried first, even if there is considerable uncertainty about
whether the penalty rule actually enhances efficiency.
71
68. Since most contract default rules have been chosen using the majoritarian paradigm, see
ScoTT & KRAUs, supra note 55, at 89-9o, the majoritarian rule is the existing default law in
most cases.
69. Posner, supra note 62, at 565, 573-86.
70. Intriguingly, penalty default rules may entail less variance than majoritarian rules when the
penalty rule is the existing default rule- as in the case of the Hadley damages rule. When the
penalty rule is the status quo, majoritarian rules become more attractive, all else equal.
When neither the majoritarian rule nor the penalty rule is the default rule, however, the
majoritarian rule will generally entail less variance.
7p. In Example 2, Policy B has a small probability of producing a favorable outcome. Penalty
defaults probably have higher probabilities of success, but success is not quite as
advantageous as in the example. If necessary, the example could be altered. The basic
principle remains the same. So long as a penalty default rule provides some possibility of a
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Trying some penalty default rules in contract law may be especially
attractive because the success of one penalty default rule may be correlated with
success in other areas. Consider a hypothetical rule forcing car insurers to
choose between prominently stating their history of rate changes or being
restricted from changing rates. This rule may yield valuable information about
another hypothetical rule forcing credit card issuers to make the same choice.
72
If the car insurance rule facilitates more informed and different consumer
decisionmaking, then the credit card rule is also likely to have an impact. If the
car insurance rule changes nothing, then it is less likely that the credit card rule
is worth its costs. The potential to extrapolate the results of the car insurance
rule increases the desirability of the rule because the car insurance rule provides
information about the credit card rule that is valuable for finding the best
policy with respect to credit cards in the future. Policymakers should therefore
be more likely to adopt the car insurance information-forcing rule, all else
equal.
The optimal search approach demonstrates that penalty default rules have
an informational value that makes them more attractive than previously
realized. The next Subsection demonstrates that a similar calculus applies to
the debate about shareholder democracy.
3. Increasing Shareholder Democracy in Corporate Law
Corporate law scholars and practitioners intensely debate the appropriate
degree of shareholder democracy and power in corporations.73 Some argue that
better outcome while involving more risk than the majoritarian rule, then the optimal search
approach dictates that the penalty default rule should be tried first in some cases.
72. Current law requires credit card issuers to prominently state their rates, but the issuers
reserve the right to change the rates unilaterally. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 16ol-i693r (2000).
73. Critics of enhanced shareholder democracy may argue that policy variance is unnecessary in
this context because federalism in corporate law already produces sufficient policy variance,
see, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2392 (1998), with the "race to the top" leading all states to adopt value-
enhancing policy variants. If one accepts this proposition, then high-variance policies are
unhelpful because the variance they provide is unlikely to find innovative policies missed by
the states. Others, however, argue that state competition for corporate charters produces
relatively little variance. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 605-
06 (2002). These arguments echo a broader debate about whether state competition for
corporate charters produces a "race to the top" -with all states providing efficient and ever-
improving laws - or a "race to the bottom" - with states undercutting each other by offering
laws that favor management or other interested parties. Compare Roberta Romano, Law As a
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shareholders should be entrusted with greater ability to dictate corporate
decisions and governance mechanisms. Others argue that enhanced
shareholder rights may undermine successful U.S. corporations by adding
costs without corresponding benefits. To date, the critics of enhanced
shareholder democracy have derailed significant expansions of shareholder
democracy-there have been very few changes to the corporate decision-
making process. The optimal search approach, by contrast, suggests that
enhanced shareholder democracy is the higher variance approach, and may
therefore be worthwhile even if its expected value is negative.
a. Increasing Shareholder Power
Most corporate governance arrangements derive from two sources -
corporate charters and the state of incorporation's corporate laws. To amend a
corporation's charter, state law requires board initiation and board submission
to a shareholder vote of any proposed amendments. To alter the state of
incorporation, a company commonly merges with a shell corporation
incorporated in the desired state. To complete the merger, the board must
initiate a shareholder vote.
74
As a result, shareholders have little say over the basic governance
arrangements of a corporation. Any major changes in these arrangements
require board approval. Critics contend that this is inefficient. If a governance
arrangement is inefficient but suits the board of directors, virtually no means
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 28o-81 (1985)
(arguing that corporate law competition creates a race to the top), and Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977) (characterizing corporate law competition as a race to the top), with Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 1o5 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1441 (1992) (describing how state competition in
corporate law does not invariably lead to a race to the top), and William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (describing state-based
corporate law as race to the bottom). The optimal search approach to corporate law
described in this Article may be valuable to this debate for two reasons. First, if Bebchuk and
Hamdani's lack-of-innovation argument is the better one, then high-variance optimal search
policies at the federal level offer the potential for great benefits. Second, attempting new
policies offers the possibility of resolving the seemingly never-ending debate about the value
of state competition in corporate law. If innovative corporate law policies are attempted but
consistently prove to be failures, then this provides strong evidence of a "race to the top."
For a thorough discussion of the relation between federalism and the optimal search
approach, see infra Subsection II.C.4 and Section IV.C.
74. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 833,
843-46 (2005).
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exist to change it because any change initiated by shareholders must be
approved by the board.
7
1
Critics of the status quo want to expand shareholder power so that
inefficient arrangements can be altered by shareholders without management
approval. They advocate expanding the scope of bylaw amendments. Bylaw
amendments may be unilaterally initiated by shareholders, but at present the
ability of bylaws to alter governance arrangements is quite limited. If the scope
of bylaw amendments were to expand, then shareholders would be able to alter
governance arrangements more easily.
76
Critics of the status quo also advocate allowing shareholders to unilaterally
initiate and approve charter amendments. Because charter amendments enable
corporations to specify their own governance arrangements and alter state
default arrangements, allowing unilateral shareholder charter amendments
would similarly enable shareholders to alter governance arrangements.77
Stephen Bainbridge and others dispute these recommendations, 8 arguing
that director primacy has "stood the test of time"79 and that
[a]ctive investor involvement in corporate decision-making seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held public
corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially
nonreviewable decision-making authority in the board of directors.
The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it
permits the aggregation of large capital pools, as some have suggested,
but rather that it provides a hierarchical decision-making structure
well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise
75. See id.
76. See id. at 844-46.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARv. L. REv. 1735, 1758 (20o6) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment];
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. Rlv. 547, 6o5-o6 (2003); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561, 598 (2006); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Corporate
Democracy: What It Is, What It Isn't, and What It Should Be, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2oo6, at 20, 23
(noting the "overwhelming historical success of the existing governance system"); see also
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1759 (2006) (critiquing
Bebchuk's proposal to increase shareholder power from the perspective of "traditionalist
investors").
79. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 78, at 1758. Note the Burkean allusions
in Bainbridge's argument.
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with numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and
other constituencies. In such an enterprise, someone must be in
charge: "Under conditions of widely dispersed information and the
need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is
essential for success.
''8.
Given these views, it is no surprise that Bainbridge and others support the
current distribution of power between shareholders and managers.
b. Changing Shareholder Voting Procedures
Unlike the "shareholder power" debate, the shareholder franchise debate
focuses narrowly on one method of corporate governance - the ability of
shareholders to elect directors and approve mergers. Even if one believes that
directors should have considerable power to make corporate decisions, one
might still argue that shareholders should be free to choose their directors. As
one Delaware Chancery Court opinion states, "The shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests.
' 8,
Scholars and courts differ regarding the effectiveness of the shareholder
franchise. 82 Delaware courts state axiomatically that shareholder voting enables
shareholders to unseat directors. 8' A variety of evidence, however, suggests that
the shareholder franchise does not work as well as the Delaware courts suggest.
For example, the stock market responds favorably to close directorial proxy
contests with dissident slate victors and unfavorably to close contests resulting
in a management victory. 84 This suggests that shareholder voting
systematically favors management to a degree not justified by stock market
8,value maximization. In addition, proxy contests are few and far between,
8o. Id. at 1749 (quoting KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974)).
81. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atias Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
82. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675 (2007)
(arguing that the shareholder franchise is illusory), with Martin Lipton & William Savitt,
The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REv. 733, 734 (2007) (arguing "that the 'myth
of the shareholder franchise' is no myth at all").
83. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) ("If the
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.").
84. See Yair Listokin, Corporate Voting vs. Market Price Setting (July 3, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.con/abstract=1112671.
85. See id.
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potentially suggesting some handicaps to the ability of dissidents to wage
proxy contests.86 Others, however, believe that the shareholder franchise works
well, noting that "under the existing rules, running an election contest through
separate proxy materials is already a viable alternative and a viable threat....




There are several reasons why the shareholder franchise may not function
efficiently. 88 First, management enjoys discretion over the timing of a vote-
within a certain range management can choose the day most likely to deliver a
victory. 9 If a previously scheduled date looks like it will result in a loss,
management enjoys the ability to change the date of the proxy vote. Second,
management benefits from superior relationships with and contact information
about shareholders." ° Dissidents must sue merely to obtain a list of
shareholders, while management often has longstanding relationships with
shareholders that may make shareholders receptive to management mailings
and arguments. Third, management bears less of the cost of proxy contests
than dissidents. 9' Management time and effort in resisting dissident proxy
challenges is paid for by the corporation. In addition, management may expend
unlimited funds from corporate coffers for soliciting proxies. Dissidents, by
contrast, are only reimbursed for proxy expenses when they defeat
management. Fourth, the prevalence of staggered boards means that a
potential dissident must win two or more proxy contests over a long period to
gain control over a corporation.92 The critics argue that these disadvantages
combine to discourage shareholders from undertaking proxy contests and to
86. See Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 682-88 (arguing that the small number of contested elections
indicates some problems with the shareholder franchise). But see Jonathan R. Macey, Too
Many Notes and Not Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor Joseph II Kvetch About
Contested Director Elections and Mozart's Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759 (2007) (arguing that
Bebchuk has no baseline for determining the appropriate number of contested elections).
87. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (June ii,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71oo3/wachtello61o3.htm; see also
Lipton & Savitt, supra note 82 (defending shareholder franchise).
88. See Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 688-94.
89. See generally Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 1O AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159 (2008) (discussing management advantages in corporate voting).
go. Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 688-94.
91. Id.
ga. Id.
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reduce the probability of winning for those shareholders that ultimately decide
to pursue proxy contests. 93
In response to these perceived problems, many have suggested changes to
the shareholder franchise. Bebchuk, for example, proposes that
"reimbursement of expenses to challengers receiving a sufficiently significant
number of votes (for example, one-third of the votes cast), and shareholder
power to replace all directors" be enacted as corporate law default rules.
94
Bebchuk argues, "Furthermore, confidential voting and majority voting should
be required in all elections." 9 Many scholars and policymakers advocate
shareholder access to the corporate ballot,96 which would enable shareholders
to propose alternative slates of directors on the proxy statements that a
corporation provides to shareholders before its annual meetings.
97
As with increasing shareholder power, many dispute proposed reforms to
the shareholder franchise. 8 Two critics of Bebchuk's proposed reforms argue
that
[i]gnoring decades of salutary historical development and the
overwhelming lessons of observed boardroom behavior, Bebchuk
advocates the abandonment of the traditional process for selecting and
retaining directors of U.S. public corporations. In its stead, Bebchuk
offers a novel electoral system of his own recent invention -a regime
specifically designed to encourage costly proxy contests .... Bebchuk
has utterly failed to carry the burden of justifying the radical reform he
proposes.... Bebchuk has systematically failed to account for the
likely and severe negative consequences [including waste and
disruption of managerial efforts, enhanced power for special interests,
excessive management short-termism, difficulty recruiting board
personnel, and adverse impact on board processes] of his proposal. 99
93. See, e.g., id.
94. Id. at 677.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAW. 43
(2003).
97. At present, dissident slates of directors must mail their own proxy forms to shareholders.
See Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 696-98.
98. See, e.g., Lipton & Savitt, supra note 82; see also Macey, supra note 86 (arguing that Bebchuk
has no baseline for determining the appropriate number of contested elections).
99. Lipton & Savitt, supra note 82, at 733-34. Again, note the strong Burkean tone to the
arguments in favor of the status quo.
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This is no mere academic debate. For a number of years culminating in
2007, the SEC has considered shareholder ballot access regulations and
received more than thirty-four thousand comment letters from members of the
public about the proposed regulations-a record number of comments.'00 In
total, the shareholder franchise debate resembles the shareholder power debate.
On the one hand, critics of the status quo identify imperfections in the
shareholder franchise and argue for various policy reforms to correct these
faults. On the other hand, a group exists that believes that the reform proposals
will add more costs than benefits and that the status quo works relatively well.
That group demands that reformers show a compelling case for change before
a change is made.
c. Optimal Search and Reforms to Shareholder Power and the
Shareholder Franchise
The academic and professional debate about the optimal degree of
shareholder power and shareholder voting demonstrates that the impact of
proposed reforms to these institutions is uncertain. In other words, the effect
of the reforms is subject to high variance. Some think the proposals will be a
home run; others fear they will be a disaster.'
Suppose that the defenders of the status quo have the better argument; the
proposed reforms are more likely to do harm than good. Does this mean that
the proposed reforms should not be enacted? The optimal search approach says
"not necessarily" -so long as the reforms are reversible. Because the proposed
reforms have high variance, they have a high search value, corresponding to
Policy B in the above example. If enhanced shareholder power and shareholder
voting mitigates agency costs and ensures that corporations are run more
efficiently, then these reforms can be continued, leading to a permanently
better outcome than the status quo. If the proposed reforms prove expensive
loo. See Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks Before the
International Corporate Governance Network (Oct. 29, 2007) (transcript available at
http ://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2oo7/spchlo29o7aln.htm) [hereinafter Nazareth Speech].
ioi. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 86; John F. Olson, Professor Bebchuk's Brave New World: A Reply
to "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise," 93 VA. L. REy. 773 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2607); E. Norman Veasey, The
Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811
(2007). It is extremely unlikely that the issue would have engendered so many comment
letters if its proponents did not think it was likely to have significantly positive effects and
its detractors did not think the reform would have negative implications.
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and make corporate decisionmaking impossible, then the reforms will not be
continued and the old status quo of director primacy and few proxy contests
will be reenacted. The status quo, by contrast, has much lower variance
because its effects on voting and corporate governance are relatively well
understood. Even if the status quo is better on average, like Policy A, it has a
lower aggregate value because it does not include the option to use the reforms
should they prove effective.
The optimal search approach refutes the argument of critics that any
reform must meet a heavy burden to justify itself. When policies can be
changed in subsequent periods, this argument is incorrect. Reforms that have
higher variance than the status quo are made desirable, rather than
undesirable, when there is more uncertainty about their effects.
4. Federalism and the Optimal Search Approach
The previous examples assume that the policy universe consists of one
jurisdiction and that policies can be changed each period. The examples also
place no obvious value on settled expectations for law. Under these conditions,
the optimal search approach offered a number of counterintuitive
recommendations for policymaking, emphasizing the option value of policies
rather than their expected value. But what if the policy universe contains
multiple government units? The optimal search approach applies with greater
force in such circumstances -policies with high variance and low expected
value become increasingly desirable from a systemwide perspective as the
number of jurisdictions increases.
Federalism is one example of a system of government with multiple
jurisdictions. A system of government is federal if "(1) two levels of
government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area
of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee ... of the
autonomy of each government in its own sphere.""0 2 The implications of the
optimal search approach derived in this Part, however, do not apply exclusively
to federalism. The analysis below applies whenever (1) a policy has correlated
effects in two or more locations, (2) these locations are separately governed,
(3) the effects of a policy are observable, and (4) policymakers care from a
normative perspective about the effects of a policy in both locations.
102. WILLIAM H. RiKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964).
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a. "Experimentalism" and Federalism
Federalism has long had an association with experimentation. 1°3 Justice
Brandeis's oft-cited description of federalism reads, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."
1 4
It is therefore not surprising that federalism and devolution are the
lynchpins of experimentation in the "democratic experimentalist" framework
discussed in Part I. Dorf and Sabel praise
a public sector model of problem solving adapted to a polity in which
omnibus, national measures can rarely address the particularities of
local experience, yet locales in isolation from one another are unable to
explore and evaluate even the most immediately promising solutions
to their problems. The model requires linked systems of local and
inter-local or federal pooling of information, each applying in its
sphere the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and
error correction, so that actors scrutinize their initial understandings
of problems and feasible solutions. These principles enable the actors
to learn from one another's successes and failures while reducing the
vulnerability created by the decentralized search for solutions."°
The criteria for choosing experiments in an "experimentalist" federal
framework are somewhat unclear. Experimentalists suggest that localities will
naturally experiment because different populations will have different policy
goals. In other words, different jurisdictions will pursue new policies because
the new policies have higher expected value for that particular jurisdiction than
do existing policies' 6 - that is, policies offering the "most immediately
103. Of course, there are many other arguments for federalism. For a comprehensive review of
these arguments, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 58-1o6 (1995). This
Article does not examine these powerful alternative justifications for federalism.
104. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Brandeis's argument for federalism has been adopted by many scholars examining a wide
variety of different contexts. A Westlaw search for law review articles quoting Justice
Brandeis's federalism-as-laboratory quotation retrieved almost seven hundred articles.
105. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 23, at 287-88.
1o6. See generally id. at 314-24 (discussing how diversity can lead to local differences in policy and
how policy should be "benchmarked" to produce new policies that are better than previous
policies).
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promising solutions to [the jurisdiction's] problems.' °7 These are the
"courageous" states-the ones that overcome inertia to attempt a new policy
with positive expected value. Other jurisdictions can costlessly observe the
outcomes of these high-variance/high-expected-value policies and adopt the
policies if they are successful while avoiding their negative effects if they are
failures.1"'
According to the experimentalist, the primary obstacles to such
experimentation are, at present, national government obstruction and local
inability to plan and evaluate different experiments.0 9 .Once these obstacles are
removed, federalism naturally produces significant amounts of
experimentation. In the experimentalist context, federalism and devolution
thereby facilitate the adoption of high-variance/high-expected-value policies,
with benefits for all jurisdictions.
b. Optimal Policy Variation Under Federalism
The most salient distinction between the experimentalist and optimal
search approaches to federalism is the degree of desirable experimentation.
Experimentalists believe that federalism facilitates passage of policies that are
risky but have positive expected value and encourages such "experiments." The
optimal search approach, by contrast, suggests that even some risky policies
that have negative expected value should be attempted, and that federalism
makes high-variance/low-expected-value policies favored by the optimal search
approach even more attractive.
When one jurisdiction tries a new policy with high variance, it opens the
possibility of continuing with this policy in future periods. But the state trying
the policy is not the only state with the option to continue with the successful
policy. When policies have similar effects across states, other states may
implement the policy that has been tried by one state. These "externalities"
raise the return to policy variance, because the upside of the risky policy can be
shared by all jurisdictions, while the low expected value of the policy is
imposed on only one jurisdiction.
107. Id. at 287.
1o8. Susan Rose-Ackerman questions the argument that federalism promotes innovation. See
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). Public choice considerations, such as public policymakers' desire
for reelection, may diminish incentives for risk taking by policymakers in a federal system.
After a thorough analysis of these incentives, Rose-Ackerman concludes that "few useful
experiments will be carried out in [state and local governments]." Id. at 594.
iog. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 23.
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Consider the choice between Policy A and Policy B, as demonstrated in
Example 3. Policy A costs nothing to implement and yields social benefits of
$50 per period within the implementing jurisdiction. Policy B costs $20 to
implement and has a probability of o.o8 of yielding benefits to the
implementing jurisdiction of $120 per period and a probability of 0.92 of
yielding benefits of $o.
Example 3.
Cost $o $20
Expected Benefit per $ 9.6 o .8($120)+0.92($)
Period
In a uni-jurisdictional world, A is a better choice than B. The payoff for A is
$50 + ~ = $500
while the payoff from B is
-',$120 .so$0]
-20+0.08 [$120+ ]+0.92[0+ = 1 I = $495.06
In spite of the optimal search benefits of B, it is an inferior policy because
its expected value is so low relative to A that the search benefits of B cannot
compensate.
Now, however, suppose that there are two jurisdictions of equal size and
importance, and that only the first jurisdiction can implement Policy B. In this
case, Policy B, with an expected value considerably inferior to Policy A,
becomes a socially optimal choice. If both jurisdictions choose Policy A, then
the benefit to each jurisdiction is
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$50
-$500
This makes the average benefit per jurisdiction equal to $500. If one
jurisdiction tries Policy B but the other jurisdiction can use Policy B if it
succeeds, then the payoff to the jurisdiction that tries B is
- 120 0 ] $950
-20+0.08 [$120+ .. +1 ]+o0.92 [o+ $ = $495.06
'= 1 -0t=2 (1l+0.1J
The payoff to the jurisdiction that does not try B, but implements B if B
proves successful is
V- $120 - $50
o.o8 [$50+ - 1+0.92 [$50+ 1 +o = $554.46
'=.(1+ 0.i 1 =2 (1 +0.i)1
The average payoff per jurisdiction if one jurisdiction tries Policy B is
therefore
$495.06 + $555.46 = $525.2 6
2
Thus, the average payoff when one jurisdiction tries Policy B is greater than
the average payoff when both jurisdictions choose A. From a social perspective,
B should be tried, in spite of its inferiority in both the uni-jurisdictional case
and in expected-value terms. This occurs because federalism allows the low-
expected-value costs of high-variance policies to be limited to one jurisdiction,
while the upside benefits of searching can be shared across jurisdictions.
Federalism thereby increases the variance-loving aspects of the optimal search
perspective. The experimentalist framework recognizes the potential for
learning from local policy variation but fails to emphasize the degree to which
variance for even policies with negative expected value is optimal.
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c. Preemption and Optimal Policy Variation
State and federal law often overlap. The Constitution and Supreme Court
precedent both establish that state law is preempted in many cases.' ° For
example, state law is preempted "where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'.
While many have critiqued this preemption standard,"2 the optimal search
approach reorients and strengthens the critique. Most scholars who critique the
preemption standard praise federalism for allowing states to choose policies
that strive to maximize the welfare of their citizens.1'3 This critique, however, is
incomplete. A policy may maximize the welfare of the citizens of a state but
cause sufficient harm to citizens in other states that the state law should be
preempted on efficiency grounds.'1 4 Indeed, on efficiency grounds courts
should strike down any state law that Congress preempts because Congress is
able to internalize the externalities imposed by state law on citizens of other
states.
The argument for preemption is significantly weakened by the optimal
search approach. Because learning is possible across both time and space in a
multi-jurisdictional world, policies that have extremely negative expected
values (such as Policy B in Example 3 above) prove to be good choices from an
optimal search perspective. To the extent that courts measure "the full
purposes and objectives of Congress" for preemption purposes by the expected
110. For a thorough examination of preemption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225
(2000).
m1i. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n,
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1921)).
na. See Nelson, supra note iio, at 229 n.i6 (cataloguing and summarizing the primary critiques
of preemption, including critiques found in KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF
PREEMPTION 47-56 (1991); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of
State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 561 (1997); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies
and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1991); Donald P. Rothschild, A
Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime To Celebrate Our New Federalism: How To Deal with the
"Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 829, 830 n.3 (1984); Paul Wolfson,
Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 114 (1988)).
113. See supra note 112.
114. Electric power production provides an excellent example. Coal-fired plants are considerably
cheaper than gas-fired plants for producing electricity. Burning coal, however, produces
more externalities than does gas. A national regulator might decide that these externalities
outweigh the benefit of cheaper power production. If the acid rain harms other states but
does not harm the state where the power is produced, however, then a state regulator may
decide to approve coal power production.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
effect of Congress's national policy, they will ignore the informational benefits
of federalism and thereby cause overpreemptionl 's Moreover, state laws
provide the greatest information when they compare in substance to the
national policies, because such policies are comprehensive enough to apply to
all locations, rather than being narrowly tailored to local idiosyncrasies.
Current law, however, places such state policies in the greatest danger of
preemption. Thus, by suppressing the optimal search value of policy variation,
preemption is likely to be overapplied considerably. Indeed, as shown in Part
IV, states pursuing the interests of their own citizens actually will provide
insufficient policy variation under many circumstances." 6 Grants to states,
therefore, should replace preemption in many cases of conflict between state
and national laws.H
7
At this point, the benefits of choosing public policies with high variance
due to the optimal search perspective have been demonstrated both
theoretically and practically in several different contexts. The remainder of the
Article addresses a number of theoretical and practical objections to the optimal
search approach and develops some recommendations for optimally garnering
the "learning" benefits of policy variance.
III. THE OPTIMAL SEARCH APPROACH: OBJECTIONS, RESPONSES,
AND MODIFICATIONS
The optimal search approach places positive value on policies with high
variance in outcomes. New policies tend to have high variance because they
have not been tested. The range of possible outcomes from a new policy is
wider than the range in outcomes from a well-tested policy. Therefore, the
optimal search approach places greater value on policy innovation than do
other approaches.
Compared to risk-averse rationalists, risk-neutral rationalists do not dislike
variance per se."' Differences between the optimal search approach and the
traditional rationalist approach stem from the value attached to variance in the
optimal search approach: the optimal search approach may choose policies
11s. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
116. This conclusion arises from the optimal search approach rather than the experimentalist
approach to federalism. See infra Section TV.C.
117. This does not mean that the benefits of standardization should be ignored. Instead, they
should be compared with the underappreciated informational benefits of variation.
118. Again, the argument will be presented in risk-neutral terms for the sake of clarity. Parallel
arguments could be made in utility terms for a risk-averse utilitarian rationalist.
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with low expected value when the policies have high variance, while the
traditional rationalist seeks to maximize expected value. That said, the
rationalist and optimal search approaches are not contradictory. The optimal
search approach merely constitutes a modification of the rationalist approach
that accounts for policy learning. In a world with reversible policies and
learning, rationalists should favor the optimal search approach, which has a
greater long-run expected benefit that a traditional rationalist approach given
the possibility of learning and changeable policies.
A. Burkean Objections
The optimal search approach's emphasis on variance brings it into direct
conflict with Burkean political theory, which stigmatizes "innovation."' 19
Indeed, Burkean political theory cautions against innovation even when
innovation aims to produce the policies with the highest expected values.
Certainly, then, the Burkean critique of innovation applies with even greater
force to the optimal search approach, which actively seeks policies with high
variance, even when they do not produce the best expected outcome. I will
argue, however, that while there are undoubtedly points of disagreement
between the optimal search approach and Burkean political theory, these
disagreements are primarily confined to the question of policy reversibility. On
other issues, the optimal search approach and Burkean theory share an
empirical inclination that makes them far from inconsistent.
Burkeans emphasize the limitations of human reason.120 They argue that
humans are unable to predict the outcomes of policies. Instead of prediction,
Burkeans stress "empiricism.'' One strand of empiricism is respect for past
practice. Past practice has been proven empirically to work in previous periods.
Therefore, it has an empirical validity absent in any new policy. A second
strand comes in the formulation of new policies. Burkeans favor incremental
change that is regularly evaluated empirically. Only when the changes pass
empirical muster should the reform process continue.
The optimal search approach conforms to these Burkean ideas. The optimal
search approach derives its effectiveness from its empiricism. Policies are
119. While Burke was opposed to "innovation" in the form of abrupt change in policy, he was
more receptive to extremely gradual policy modifications. See Ian Harris, Edmund Burke, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 8 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/burke/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
120. See supra Part I.
121. Young, supra note 7, at 646.
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tested, and they are continued only if they are effective. Rather than asserting
that one policy is better than another, the optimal search approach encourages
empirical testing of policies until a successful policy is found. While there is
inevitably some rational judgment attached to choice of policies in the optimal
search approach-one must be able to guess at the policies' variance and
expected value 22 -one can be skeptical of human reason and support the
optimal search approach. Indeed, so long as the overlooked limitations of
human reason do not inject bias into the process but only greater variance,
12
the limitations may increase the argument for change in the optimal search
approach where greater variance is a positive rather than a negative trait.
The optimal search approach also partly satisfies another Burkean virtue
that is often absent from traditional rationalist discourse. Anthony Kronman
stresses Burke's vision of trusteeship- that present-day individuals have
obligations to both future and past generations.' 4 As Burke stated,
[O]ne of the first and most leading principles on which the
commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary
possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have received
from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should act as
if they were the entire masters; that they should not think it among
their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance,
by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society
125
The optimal search approach recommends considerable innovation. I will
not claim that this represents deference to the choices of past generations; the
policies of past generations will frequently be changed. To the extent that
deference to past generations is tantamount to the maintenance of past policies,
122. There is some rational judgment required for the Burkean approach as well. Unless
Burkeans want to have rigid laws, which Burke (at least) did not, there must be some
rational evaluation of new policies and debate about the scope by which they change existing
policy.
123. That is, suppose that the range of possible outcomes is much wider than an expert thinks,
but the increase in variability occurs on both the positive side and the negative side. If the
negative consequences of a policy change increase but the positive consequences do not,
then the expected value of a policy change goes down and the policy change becomes less
attractive under the optimal search approach.
124. See Kronman, supra note 16, at 1066-68.
125. EDMUND BuRKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 81 (Frank M. Turner ed.,
2003).
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the optimal search approach is unfaithful to the past. This does not mean that
the optimal search approach rejects the policies of past generations, however.
In the optimal search approach, it is critical for policymakers to revert to
previous policies if innovative policies fail. Policies are not changed because
they are bad; they are changed because of the benefit of finding something
better.
While the optimal search approach places the present in a rejectionist
relationship with the past, it also places the present generation in a more
harmonious relationship with future generations. The optimal search approach
dictates that on some occasions a high-variance/low-expected-value policy is
desirable even though it reduces present well-being, because of the value of the
information to future periods. In other words, the present generation is
sacrificing some benefit today in exchange for future benefits. The future
generation enjoys all the benefits of the optimal search approach without any
of the costs, enabling the present generation to confer a considerable benefit on
future generations.126
It is also important to note that the optimal search approach does not
command innovation. If a successful policy has been found, then the optimal
search approach does not contradict the Burkean suggestion. Both approaches
will retain the current policy-the optimal search approach retains the policy
because the search has ended, and the Burkean approach retains the policy
because of the risks of innovation. It is true, however, that by emphasizing the
informational benefits of innovation, the optimal search approach creates
additional situations where innovation is worthwhile. In addition, the two
approaches sharply differ in their recommendations when both agree that
change is desirable. The optimal search approach favors high-variance policies;
the Burkean approach favors incremental changes.
Given these similarities between the Burkean approach and the optimal
search approach, why are the policy recommendations of the two so different?
The simple answer concerns irreversibility. The optimal search approach
assumes that the effects of policies can be observed and policies can change to
reflect policy learning. When these assumptions fail, the optimal search
approach no longer recommends innovation.'27 Indeed, when policies are
126. This does not mean that the present generation is behaving altruistically. The optimal
search approach benefits all members of the present generation who will enjoy the potential
benefits of policy innovation in future periods. Alternatively, the present generation could
consume some of the surplus created by the optimal search approach for future generations
by leaving less for future generations along other dimensions. Because the optimal search
approach creates value, such gain sharing could leave all generations better off.
127. This will be discussed in detail in Section III.C.
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irreversible or extremely sticky, the optimal search approach recommends
conservative policymaking that recognizes the "real option" value of these
polices.128
Burkeans, however, must reconcile their faith in empiricism with claims of
irreversibility. If policies cannot be changed, then the Burkean approach -slow
changes only when the existing policies cease to be effective - cannot be carried
out. So Burkeans at least recognize the potential for policy learning and change
that is the linchpin of the optimal search approach. To favor cautious policy
change, Burkeans must argue that the reversibility of policies depends on their
variance-that drastic changes in policy are irreversible, while incremental
changes in policy are easy to reverse. Variance may be related to reversibility, as
discussed in the next Section. But high variance does not imply irreversibility.
Some policies may be high variance but easily reversible, while other policies
may involve little variance but prove hard to reverse. Burkean thought does not
emphasize the harms of variance because of irreversibility. Instead, it
emphasizes the potential for bad outcomes, rather than irreversible outcomes,
from changing policies.
B. The Costs of Changing Policies
Part II demonstrated that when policies can be changed without cost, high-
variance policies become increasingly attractive. But what if policy changes are
costly? This Part examines the consequences of policy irreversibility and inertia
for optimal policymaking.
First, irreversibility must be defined. Some aspects of all policies- such as
the costs of learning about them or implementing them-are always
irreversible, but this does not mean that the policy as a whole is irreversible.
Instead, a policy is irreversible if the policy itself or a significant portion of its
effects can never be undone. 29
There are several sources of irreversibility. This Article focuses on two of
those sources. The first source entails costs involved in implementing a new
128. For a detailed description of the "real options" approach, see infra Subsection III.C.I.
129. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 860-64 (distinguishing between irreversibility as "seriousness"
and irreversibility as "sunk costs"). The definition provided here resembles the sunk cost
definition. A cost is sunk if it cannot be retrieved. A policy with long-lasting effects can
therefore be represented as having a high initial cost-measured as the present discounted
value of the future effects -or it can be represented as having costs distributed over a long
time period. In the numerical examples, I choose to equate irreversibility with long-lasting
effects, but the two methods are mathematically equivalent.
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policy. The second source involves policy effects that linger, even if the formal
policy is changed in a subsequent period.'30
A new policy must be formulated and implemented. Some of the costs of
policy formulation and implementation are functions of institutional design
and will be discussed below, but other costs remain in any institutional setting.
Policymaking requires considerable amounts of policymakers' time and
effort-an important and irretrievable cost. Policymakers can only enact so
many new policies in any given period.' 31 In addition, individuals must learn
about and evaluate the new policy, adding additional costs. Furthermore, many
individuals exhibit "status quo bias," creating yet another barrier to policy
change.'32
Many of these costs can never be retrieved. These are sunk costs and
therefore irreversible.'33 For example, the costs of learning about a new law or
overcoming cognitive discomfort with change are not reimbursed or eliminated
if the law is subsequently changed. Irreversible sunk costs do not prevent
policy changes in the future. From the future's perspective, the costs are sunk
and therefore irrelevant. From an ex ante perspective, however, these costs
represent a disincentive to change laws.
Some reforms require considerable irreversible costs for implementation in
addition to drafting and learning costs. Consider a strong defense policy.
Defense infrastructure and weaponry is expensive, and the costs of building a
defense system cannot be retrieved if a future policymaker decides that the
policy is ineffective and that the system should be destroyed or sold. Similarly,
a regulation that requires installation of new manufacturing equipment that
provides no value other than compliance with the regulation entails significant
irreversible costs.
Inertia-causing sunk costs characterize all new policies. Indeed, if inertia is
total, then a model of optimal policy changes is moot because there will be no
13o. Almost all sources of irreversibility can be placed within these two broad categories. For
example, inertia can be described as resulting from high formulation and implementation
costs.
131. There are many policies that may have positive expected value, but cannot be implemented
because of the scarcity of legislative time and effort. These time and effort expenditures are
irretrievable opportunity costs of formulating a particular policy.
132. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 197-99.
133. See DiXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 6, at 8-9. The effects of a policy in the current period are
obviously irreversible. If a policy is a failure, these effects cannot be recouped by changing
the policy in the future period. These costs are accounted for in both the optimal search
approach and the real options approach, which have countervailing benefits that surpass
these per-period costs in many cases.
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policy changes. So inertia must be partial rather than total. The following
analysis of the effect of irreversibility on optimal policy assumes that inertia
makes policies more long lasting, but not infinite. The greater the sunk costs
described here, the stronger the power of policy inertia.
Some policies will have additional and ongoing irreversible costs. If a policy
causes the extinction of a species, for example, then the effects of the policy
linger even if the policy is subsequently changed. Similarly, greenhouse gas
abatement policies have long, intergenerational time horizons given that some
of these gases linger in the atmosphere for centuries.134 These policies are more
irreversible than the typical policy. Although, the typical policy demands
irreversible upfront costs, the effects of the policy last only as long as the policy
is enacted. "Irreversible effect" policies, by contrast, entail not only irretrievable
upfront costs but also irreversible effects in future periods.
C. Irreversibility, Real Options, and the Optimal Search Approach
1. The Real Options Approach to Policymaking
Suppose that Policy B in Example 2 of Part II (the high-variance/low-
expected-value policy) were irreversible. That is, if B were chosen initially, the
policymaker could not then change to Policy A in a future period. This
situation could arise if Policy B had irreversible effects or if changing Policy B
once it had been enacted would entail infinite irretrievable switching costs - for
example, if people would become so attached to Policy B that they could not
bear the cognitive costs of switching. Under these circumstances, Policy A (the
policy with higher expected value) would be preferred on rationalist, Burkean,
and optimal search grounds. A has higher average value per period and
therefore A would be preferable to B when change is impossible; irreversibility
eliminates the value of a search for a highly effective policy through the choice
of Policy B. Note that this conclusion depends upon an asymmetry of
irreversibility: A can be changed-otherwise Policy B would not be under
consideration- but B is unchangeable.
Indeed, when policies are irreversible, a counterpoint to the optimal search
approach-the real options approach- applies.' The real options approach
demonstrates that when new policies are irreversible and uncertainty about the
134. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 28
(2007) ("The impacts of climate change are persistent and develop over time. Once in the
atmosphere, some [greenhouse gases] stay there for hundreds of years.").
135. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 860-69.
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policies' value can be resolved without implementing the policies, delayed
implementation of policies with positive expected value is often more efficient
than immediate implementation. By implementing an irreversible but
attractive policy today, policymakers lose the ability to learn more about the
policy in this period and to use that knowledge to determine whether to
implement the policy in the next period. The loss of this "real option" to learn
more and decide in the future may be more expensive than the cost of losing
the use of an effective policy for another period. Therefore, delayed
implementation of seemingly attractive policies may be efficient when policies
are irreversible.
As an illustration, see Example 4 as follows:
Example 4.
Cost $0 $20
Exeted Beniefit per $50 $72=o.6($120)+0.4($0)
Period
The single period utilitarian calculus now prefers B to A, since B has higher
expected value. Suppose, however, that once Policy B is chosen, A can no
longer be chosen (Policy B is irreversible, but not Policy A) and that the true
value of B will be revealed in the next period regardless of whether Policy B is
implemented. Under these conditions, the value of choosing B in the current
period is
$120 04E$o
-20+o.6 ( 0 4 1 $[ - =$700
The value of waiting to learn B's true payoff, implementing B if B proves to be
effective, and retaining A if B is a failure is
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/=2 t=2 (1+O.1 $
which is greater than the value of choosing B immediately. By waiting to
implement B until the true effects of B are known, the policymaker gives up B's
higher expected value in one period, but gains the benefit of avoiding B should
B prove to be a failure. In this example, the benefits of avoiding B are greater
than the benefits of enjoying B for an extra period, so the policymaker should
delay implementation of B until the next period.
The real options approach demonstrated in this example is the complement
of the optimal search approach. When policies are reversible, searching for
excellent policies is cheap, so innovative policies with high variance become
preferred to some policies with greater expected value but lower upside. When
new policies are irreversible, old policies are reversible, and learning about new
policies is possible without implementing them, policymakers should delay
implementation to learn more about proposed new policies.
2. Burkeanism, the Precautionary Principle, and the Real Options Approach
Whatever the real options approach says about entrenchment, one way to
interpret the Burkean critique and the precautionary principle in risk regulation
is to say that they refer to irreversible risks.36 As the example shows, when
policies are irreversible, Burkean conservatism is preferred to a choice of the
policy with the highest expected value from a rationalist perspective. Note that
some environmental policies, such as carbon dioxide emissions, may have
nearly irreversible effects, implying that a precautionary "real options"
approach applies to them.
The distinction between irreversible and catastrophic should also be
emphasized. Some harms, such as the loss of a species, may be irreversible, but
many would argue that such harms are not catastrophic. By contrast, other
harms, such as large, one-time financial costs, can be characterized as
catastrophic but are not necessarily irreversible. For example, once a
catastrophic economic harm is experienced, an economy may return to its
136. Sunstein makes exactly this argument in his article, Irreversible and Catastrophic. See
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 855-64. His.article assumes that cost-benefit analysis is superior to
the precautionary principle when risks are reversible and does not consider the possibility
that reversibility may imply a deviation from expected-value maximization that is similar in
logic but very different in outcome from the irreversible harm precautionary principle.
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previous steady state.' 7 The real options approach and Example 4 above justify
the precautionary principle in the face of irreversibility, but not in the face of
catastrophic harm. If catastrophes are painful but sufficiently short-lived, then
the logic of the optimal search approach described in Part II still applies.
Catastrophic losses are not irrelevant to the optimal search approach. They
lower the expected value of a policy, and this in turn lowers the desirability of a
policy in the optimal search approach. The possibility of reversible catastrophic
losses, however, does not undermine the learning value of experimental
policies in the optimal search approach.
Thus, risk regulation should hinge on the question of reversibility as well
as the expected impacts of a regulation. Subsection II.C.i demonstrated that
reversible regulations should be chosen according to the variance-loving
optimal search approach. This conclusion often applies even when there are
high sunk costs associated with implementing a new policy-the new
regulation in that Subsection cost more than the old one. This Subsection, by
contrast, explains that asymmetric irreversible policies should be chosen
according to the real options approach. Most risk regulations, and indeed most
policies, are neither completely reversible nor asymmetrically irreversible. The
next Subsection examines the implications of partial reversibility for optimal
policymaking.
3. Sticky but Reversible Policies
When policies are reversible, the optimal search approach indicates that
high-variance policies become attractive relative to low-variance policies with
lower expected value. When policies are asymmetrically irreversible, the real
options approach indicates that cautious implementation becomes attractive
relative to expected-value maximization. Policies, of course, are neither fully
reversible nor irreversible. Interestingly, partial reversibility makes naive per-
period expected-value maximization more plausible than the previous analysis
has indicated.
Suppose that all policies are sticky but not irreversible. For example,
suppose that policies can be reversed after four periods.138 Now consider the
137. This discussion is not meant to minimize the harms caused by catastrophic occurrences, but
to develop an analytical distinction between catastrophic and irreversible.
138. The choice of four periods is arbitrary, but this choice demonstrates how partial reversibility
brings optimal policy choices closer to naive expected-value maximization. Partial
reversibility could also be denoted by imposing a significant switching cost on any change in
policy. The two methods can be made mathematically equivalent, as the longevity of a policy
that should be changed imposes a cost that is directly analogous to a high switching cost.
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examples used to illustrate the optimal search (Example 2) and real options
(Example 4) approaches. First consider the optimal search example (Example
2), which had the following parameters:
Cost $0 $20
Upside Benefit $50 $120
Downside Benefit $50 $0
Upside Probability 1 0.2
Expected Benefit per $24=.2($12)+o.8($o)
Period
Policy A surpasses Policy B from an expected-value perspective. The
discussion of optimal search in Part II demonstrated that when policies are
fully reversible, Policy B should be tried before A. When policies must be
maintained for four periods, however, Policy A becomes a better choice than
Policy B. Thus, the introduction of some policy stickiness brings optimal
choices closer to the naive expected-value maximization approach rather than
the variance-loving optimal search approach.
Now consider Example 4, which was used to illustrate the real options
approach. As demonstrated in Subsection III.C.i, although B trumps A in
expected-value terms, the real options approach suggests that A should be
chosen before B when B is irreversible. Now, however, modify Example 4 to
suppose that policies are sticky but not irreversible -all policies (A and B) can
be reversed after four periods but no sooner. 3 9 The payoff for choosing A in
the current period 140 and retaining it for at least four periods is
139. As in Example 4, the true impact of Policy B can be learned without actually implementing
Policy B.
140. Policy A, like Policy B, can only be changed after four periods in this example. Policy A has
no variance in outcomes, so the delay is not caused by the time needed to observe the effects
of Policy A. The delay could be caused by a delay in the ability to evaluate Policy B when
Policy B is not being implemented. (Recall that the only reason to change Policy A under the
real options approach is after Policy B has been proven effective.)
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$120 $50 $s
t$50 + o.6 [-20 + 10.4 [ $ 774.87
t1=1t 5 (1 + O.4
while the payoff for choosing Policy B in the current period and retaining it for
at least four periods is
- $120 00 $50
-2o+ o.6 [ t2+ ] +0.4 + 04]1 =$836.6ot=, (1 y .1 t=5 (1 rOl
When policies are symmetrically and partially sticky, the optimal policy is B
in the current period. Policy B is the choice with the highest expected value, so
introducing the possibility of reversibility -even sticky reversibility- moves
the optimal policy from the cautious real options approach toward naive
expected-value maximization. Thus, when policies are partially sticky, the low
per-period expected-value choices prescribed by the optimal search approach
and the real options approach become less attractive. Instead, choices that
maximize per-period expected value become increasingly desirable.
The optimal policy choices under a range of reversibility conditions have
now been characterized. Under the real options approach, the more irreversible
a new policy is, the more policymakers should favor caution as opposed to
expected-value maximization. At some intermediate level of reversibility,
policymakers should jettison the real options approach and simply choose the
policy that has the greatest expected value, regardless of the policy's variance.
As reversibility becomes relatively cheap, policymakers should favor innovation
and variance relative to expected-value maximization under the optimal search
approach.
The degree of policy reversibility is therefore a critical determinant of the
appropriate policy choice. The next Section briefly identifies high reversibility
settings conducive to high-variance policies under the optimal search approach.
D. Optimal Variance in Different Policymaking Contexts
Some policymaking settings have much greater costs associated with
implementing new policies than do others. As a general matter, the lower the
costs associated with policy change, the greater the benefit of variance in policy
selection. Before analyzing different policymaking contexts, several points are
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
worth noting. The discussion assumes that the present offers the opportunity
for policy change-perhaps because a policy has become highly salient-but
that future opportunities for policy change may be limited. The discussion,
moreover, assumes that the mechanisms of policymaking in each context are
fixed-that is, that statutory lawmaking procedures cannot be altered.
41
Finally, this Section does not aim to provide a thorough analysis of different
policymaking contexts. Instead, it aims to propose how the costs and benefits
of policy variance should be informed by the institutional policymaking
environment.
Constitutional policymaking in the United States is characterized by
extreme inertia. The "transaction costs" of changing constitutional policy are
extremely high. All amendments to the Constitution must be proposed by
supermajorities of both houses of Congress or by a supermajority of the states'
legislatures, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states.1 42 Therefore,
a constitutional policy is likely to be extremely sticky. If policymakers choose a
high-variance constitutional policy for the information it provides and the
policy proves to be a failure, the policy might be impossible to change, making
the information of little value. Even if a majority of decisionmakers views the
policy as a failure, the onerous supermajority requirement makes changing the
failed policy extremely difficult and costly so long as some minority of
decisionmakers favors the policy.1 43 As a result, constitutional policymaking
should maximize expected value per period rather than other measures. If one
type of change is possible in the future but not another-for instance, a
constitutional amendment can be implemented but not reversed-then
constitutional policymaking should be made according to the real options
approach. Although the enactment of a new constitutional policy appears more
efficient on average, policymakers should delay implementing irreversible
changes in order to first obtain more information about these changes.
144
Statutory policymaking requires multiple levels of approval. A statute must
be approved by the House and Senate and then signed by the President or
141. This assumption is relaxed in later Sections.
142. U.S. CONST. art. V.
143. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the judicial
Manipulation ofLegislative Enactment Costs, 1j8 YALE L.J. 2, 15-16 (2008).
144. It should be acknowledged, of course, that even constitutional policymaking is not
impossible to reverse. The Eighteenth Amendment implementing Prohibition can be seen as
an innovative constitutional policy -there are compelling theoretical arguments in favor of
Prohibition-that was judged a failure and then repealed. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII,
JXI. The long lag between Prohibition and repeal, however, demonstrates the inertia of
constitutional policymaking.
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supported by enough legislators to overcome a veto.' 45 Each stage involves
considerable costs, including the costs of placing an item on the agenda,
learning about the relevant issues, and reconciling competing visions about the
optimal policy. Given these costs, statutory policies exhibit considerable inertia.
The costs of statutory policymaking, however, are considerably smaller than
those incurred in constitutional policymaking- statutes generally require only
ordinary majorities rather than supermajorities for approval.
Statutory policymaking therefore does not constitute an ideal setting for
high-variance policies via the optimal search approach. If a high-variance/low-
expected-value policy is enacted and proves a failure, the costs of policy change
will discourage the implementation of policy change. The informational value
of a high-variance policy is reduced in this context, since it will be difficult to
act upon the knowledge provided by a new policy. It should be emphasized,
however, that statutes, unlike constitutional amendments, are enacted
frequently. Therefore, information produced by policy experimentation has
positive value and should not be ignored when deciding upon statutory
policies.
Judicial policymaking, particularly at the appellate level, entails lower costs
than constitutional or statutory policymaking. 146 Courts generally are much
smaller than legislatures, reducing the absolute costs of judicial agenda-setting
and learning. Judicial policymaking also requires fewer approvals to become
official policy. The policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory
interpretation by the Supreme Court, for example, is instantly enacted. The
interpretation can be overruled by statute or constitutional amendment, but
such reversals require considerable time and effort, as discussed above. A
judicial policy can be reversed cheaply, by contrast, through a subsequent
Supreme Court decision.
Stare decisis raises the cost of judicial policymaking above these direct costs
by encouraging or requiring judges to follow precedents. 147 If judges internalize
stare decisis and violation of these doctrines imposes costs on judges, then
high-variance policy innovations become less attractive. These innovations will
be costly to introduce because they violate stare decisis. Moreover, once
introduced, the policies will be costly to reverse because they will become the
new frame of reference for stare decisis.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
146. Judges are policymakers in the sense that they create rules affecting future behavior. See
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (noting the power of state
judges to "make" common law).
147. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992).
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In total, the formal constitutional status of judicial policymaking appears to
provide an ideal setting for policy experimentation via the optimal search
approach. Formally, judicial policies can be enacted and changed quickly
relative to constitutional and statutory policies, raising the informational value
of innovative policies. Experimentation should be reduced in settings where
stare decisis is accorded more weight. Adherence to these doctrines raises the
costs of policy change, and thereby raises the expected costs of policy
innovation with low expected value but high upside. Subsection III.E. 3
examines the costs and benefits of stare decisis and judicial minimalism while
considering the optimal search approach.
Administrative policymaking, via rulemaking, entails intermediate
policymaking costs. On the one hand, administrative agencies have
institutional coherence lacking in legislative bodies- employees of
administrative agencies are "employees" rather than members of a legislative
body. The employees' superior-the head of the agency or the President, can
impose policymaking direction, reducing the costs of enacting new policies for
agencies as compared to legislative bodies. 1 8
On the other hand, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes
several procedural requirements for administrative policymaking. 149
Administrative "rulemaking" constitutes the primary mechanism whereby
administrators "prescribe policy."' s While the costs of these requirements are
real, they are not particularly onerous relative to the requirements for
constitutional or statutory policymaking. Notice-and-comment rulemaking,
for example, requires public notice of intent to formulate a policy and the
opportunity for the public to respond to the intended rule, followed by agency
consideration of the comments and possible (but not obligatory) revision of
the policy."' While the costs of noticing a policy change to the public and
receiving and responding to comments are real, they are not prohibitive.
Indeed, efficient policymaking may well benefit from public feedback, so that
148. This is not to say, however, that administrative agencies are inclined to change policies.
Indeed, they may have incentives not to make frequent policy changes. These incentives will
be examined in Part IV. See also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY (1990) (discussing inertia in administrative agencies).
149. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
1so. Section 551 of the APA defines a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy." Id. § 551(4).
151. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 901-02 (2oo8) (providing a comprehensive
description of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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the costs of notice-and-comment are outweighed by the benefits. Neither
formal rulemaking nor hybrid rulemaking appears to present overwhelming
costs. While the recordkeeping requirements of formal rulemaking
undoubtedly add to costs, such costs again appear small relative to the
potential impacts of policy. Administrative policymaking appears to have
greater reversibility than constitutional or statutory policymaking. Accordingly,
administrative policymakers should pay greater attention to the optimal search
benefits of innovative high-variance policies. If such policies fail, the
administrative process should not provide an insuperable obstacle to changing
them. If they succeed, then policymakers will have made a potentially
important policy advancement.
In total, the optimal degree of policy variance depends critically on the
institutional setting in which policymaking occurs. Learning through policy
variation only becomes important when policymakers can apply the lessons
learned by observing the impacts of different policies. When policymakers
applying these lessons and changing policy face important institutional
hurdles, such as in the constitutional and statutory policymaking contexts,
then high-variance/low-expected-value policies become relatively undesirable.
The transaction costs associated with policymaking change thus preclude the
benefits of the optimal search approach. Many of these transaction costs are the
result of deliberate choices rather than unavoidable realities. The next Section
examines aspects of institutional design that hinder reversibility through the
optimal search perspective. Applying the optimal search lens to these design
questions reveals a hitherto unexamined cost of principles such as stare decisis
and separation of powers.
E. Reversibility and Institutional Design
While some degree of policymaking inertia is inevitable, institutional
choices contribute greatly to the degree of inertia. The optimal search approach
highlights a cost of this inertia; inertia discourages high-variance/low-
expected-value policies that improve social welfare in the long run only if the
lessons learned from these policies can be implemented in future policy. This
Section examines how the value of reversibility and optimal search informs
some specific questions of institutional design.
Most advocates of policymaking transaction costs are well aware that these
costs hinder the development of some efficient policies. '52 They advocate
152. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 143, at 15-16 (acknowledging that judicially imposed costs
to the enactment of new legislation may lead to the prevention of "socially desirable,
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institutional principles such as separation of powers because they believe that
these institutions reduce the risk of excessive concentration of power."5 3 The
purpose of the discussion in this Section is not to contradict these claims.
Instead, this Section argues that these advocates' analysis of policy transaction
costs is incomplete. While everyone agrees that transaction costs prevent the
enactment of some policies with positive expected value and accepts this as a
cost worth bearing, most overlook the potential learning benefits of high-
variance/low-expected-value policies. The previous Sections have shown that
such policies are often extremely desirable because of their potential to provide
better outcomes and better knowledge. Thus, policy transaction costs do not
merely delay some good policies, but also prevent the dynamic benefits of
learning through variation. Preventing such learning may be a greater cost of
institutional transaction costs than the simple prevention of some appealing
policies.
Indeed, the importance of reversibility in institutional design may have
some positive salience in addition to the normative approach taken through
most of this Article.
1. Sunset Clauses and Legislative Entrenchment
The difference between legislative entrenchment and sunset clauses
demonstrates the distinctions between the real options approach and the
optimal search approach."5 4  Legislative entrenchment, which is
unconstitutional,"s is "the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative
rules that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same
form.',, 6 One implication of the rule against legislative entrenchment is that
legislatures cannot make irreversible policies. Sunset clauses, by contrast,
"cause a statute to lapse, by operation of law, after a defined period [and] are
constitutionally justifiable legislation" if, for example, the judiciary has incomplete
information).
153. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the separation of powers aims "not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power"); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 1o5 YALE
L.J. 1725, 1826-28 (1996) (praising separation of powers but recognizing that it hinders
"action").
154. For an examination of legislative entrenchment doctrines, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, iii YALE L.J. 1665, 1665-66 (2002).
155. See Newton v. Comm'rs, loo U.S. 548, 559 (1879); 1 Wn.LAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES
*90.
156. Posner &Vermeule, supra note 154, at 1667.
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the mirror image of entrenching clauses.""'7 In some sense, almost all policies
have sunset clauses -policies automatically lapse when new policies on the
same subject are instituted. Sunset clauses simply reduce the cost of changing
policies in the future. Instead of requiring costly effort to change a policy, a
sunset clause reverses the policy by default. Sunset clauses therefore enhance
the reversibility of policies.
Posner and Vermeule call for the abolition of the restriction on "legislative
entrenchment.' 1s8  They argue that legislative entrenchment enables
government to commit itself to a certain course of action, thereby increasing
the ability of individuals and other government actors to take actions that rely
on the government continuing with its course of action. 9 They also note that
"[e]ntrenchment is no more objectionable in terms of constitutional, political,
or economic theory than are sunset clauses. ''16o
Contradicting Posner and Vermeule, the optimal search and real options
perspectives developed here explain why entrenchment is barred while sunset
clauses are legitimate from an economic perspective. The real options approach
demonstrates why irreversible policies with positive expected value-exactly
the type of laws that Posner and Vermeule suggest should be entrenched- are
often suboptimal choices because of the degree to which they restrict future
policymaking options. The real options approach demonstrates that flexibility,
which is impeded by legislative entrenchment, often has greater value than a
policy with a higher expected value in a dynamic setting. If legislators
appropriately 'value future flexibility, then no restriction on legislative
entrenchment is necessary-the legislators will appropriately weigh the
commitment benefits of entrenchment against the loss of flexibility. Of course,
if legislators are so forward-looking, then the benefits of entrenchment-
primarily, the promise that future legislators will not renege on a policymaking
commitment-are negligible. Forward-looking policymakers will realize the
loss of credibility incurred by reneging on a policy and will only renege on the
policy if the benefits outweigh the costs, making entrenchment unnecessary. If
legislators cannot value the future appropriately, then there is a good
possibility that they will not place an appropriate value on future flexibility,
which the real options approach demonstrates can be considerable. To protect
the considerable benefits of future flexibility, entrenchment should be.
restricted.
157. Id. at 1676.
158. Id. at 1666.
15g. See id. at 1670-73.
160. Id. at 1666.
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Sunsetting, by contrast, presents the opposite implications. It makes
policies more reversible. In the optimal search approach, this is unambiguously
positive, as it enhances the search for excellent policies. Indeed, the optimal
search approach suggests that policy sunsetting justifies the adoption of
policies with negative expected value. Sunsetting therefore enhances efficient
policymaking, while legislative entrenchment hinders efficiency.
As a result, enhanced use of sunset clauses should be encouraged to enable
public policymakers to gain more of the learning benefits of the optimal search
approach in the face of irreversible costs. Suppose that there are multiple
policies that should be tried in a given order under the optimal search
approach. Passing each of these policies in succession would be costly. It would
require policymakers to learn and relearn the benefits of each policy alternative
and also would require that each policy alternative make its way onto the
legislative agenda. These costs may well prevent policymakers from choosing
policies according to the optimal search approach's prescriptions.
The use of sunset clauses can reduce these costs. Policymakers can pass a
law that specifies that each policy should be tried for a given amount of time, to
be followed by the next policy. If any experimental policy were deemed
particularly successful, then future policymakers would be free to enshrine that
policy as the permanent law at any point. Inertia, however, would lead to
policy change rather than policy stagnancy. The final sunset provision could
revert back to the law that existed before the reforms, or it could use a "penalty
sunset" analogous to the penalty default rules described above. A penalty
sunset would introduce an unpleasant final law that would strongly encourage
future legislators to overcome policymaking inertia. Once legislators overcome
this inertia, it is likely (though far from guaranteed) that the lessons learned
through this statutory optimal search would be heeded.
2. Separation of Powers
Policy reversibility is partially determined by the degree to which powers
are separated. Separation of powers refers to a government division into
separate branches, with each branch holding the ability to check other branches
from making policy. 6' Policy change when policymaking power is divided is
much more difficult and expensive than policy change when policymaking
power is concentrated. For example, statutory policymaking in the United
States - an institutional design marked by separation of powers - requires the
approval of two houses of a legislative body as well as the executive. Statutes
161. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51 (James Madison).
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are then subject to judicial review. Approval from these disparate bodies
requires political movements to win several consecutive elections before
obtaining unobstructed policymaking authority.16 Unicameral parliamentary
systems, by contrast, require only one such vote of approval. Once a political
movement gains control of parliament in a single election, they may enact
policy changes with relatively few institutional hurdles.
Separation of powers offers important costs and benefits. Because each
branch of government checks the others, separation of powers prevents the
accumulation of centralized power and limits the opportunity for abuse of
power."' Separation of powers also produces greater deliberation and
specialization within government. 6 4 These benefits of separation of powers do
not come without a cost, as even advocates of separation of powers
acknowledge. 16, "The price of separation is that it makes it more difficult for
the federal government to act-whether for good or bad purposes.,,' 66 In other
words, separation of powers makes all policies less reversible by raising the
transaction costs of making and changing policy.
This discussion does not intend to dispute any of the purported benefits of
separation of powers, nor does it attempt to conclude that power in the U.S.
government is currently overseparated or underseparated. Instead, the optimal
search approach shows an underestimated cost of making it more difficult for
the government to act. Not only does such a restriction slow down the passage
of some good laws, as is well appreciated, but high policymaking costs also
alter the optimal choice of policies. If it is easy for the government to act, the
government can choose high-variance/low-expected-value policies and learn
from these policies, changing them when they fail. When reversing policies
becomes difficult, as is the case with separation of powers, the benefits of
policy variance are reduced. Policies with low expected value become
increasingly unattractive when they cannot be changed easily. As a result,
separation of powers hinders learning through policy variation in addition to
simply slowing down the process of government.
162. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REv. 633, 650 (2000).
163. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
164. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Of Balkanized Empires and Cooperative Allies: A Bicentennial Essay on
the Separation of Powers, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 73, 75-76 (1987).
165. See, e.g., supra note 153 (quoting Justice Brandeis).
166. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989, 991
(2006).
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3. Stare Decisis
The reversibility of judicial policies is partially determined by the degree to
which judges adhere to stare decisis. 6 7 Absolute stare decisis, when a court
never overrules its own previous decisions, implies irreversibility of judicial
policy. Less stringent forms of stare decisis, in which a court avoids overruling
precedent absent an unusually strong justification, limit but do not prevent
policy reversals. Stare decisis raises the transaction costs of policy change. In
addition to the ordinary costs of changing policy, such as informing the
relevant parties regarding the change, stare decisis requires judges to violate a
principle when changing policy. Other things equal, raising the costs of policy
change will reduce the number of changes.
Stare decisis is the subject of a vast literature. 68 Some praise stare decisis,
claiming that stability and moderation are particularly important for judges
and that "restraint in decision-making and respect for decisions once made are
the keys to preservation of an independent judiciary and public respect for the
judiciary's role as a guardian of rights. '' 69 Stare decisis also has many critics.
Justice Scalia, for example, has stated, "I would think it a violation of my oath
to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon the democratic
process in order that the Court might save face."' 7°
As with the separation-of-powers discussion, I do not intend to weigh the
many positives and negatives of stare decisis. I believe, however, that both the
advocates and detractors of stare decisis have overlooked a cost that is
illuminated by the optimal search perspective. The cost of stare decisis is not
simply that it allows incorrect decisions to linger. In addition, stare decisis
changes the initial optimal decision for judges. Instead of choosing high-
variance/low-expected-value policies and gaining the learning benefits of the
optimal search approach, stare decisis pushes judges away from high-variance
policies. 1'' When judicial policies are difficult or impossible to reverse because
167. For an illuminating discussion of stare decisis, see RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 371-82 (1996).
168. For one recent discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 9o
MINN. L. REv. 1173 (2006).
169. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis andJudicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 281, 289-90
(1990).
170. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 8o5, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Judges can choose policies explicitly under the common law. See Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (noting the power of state judges to "make" common
law). When they are interpreting statutes, judges enjoy less discretion, as they are
constrained by principles of statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, judges can choose
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of stare decisis, judges will choose policies with high expected value that are
unlikely to need changes. Extreme stare decisis leads to judicial policymaking
under the real options approach, in which a low-expected-value precedent is
kept while policymakers learn more about a potentially better option. As
demonstrated above, the optimal search approach leads to better long-term
outcomes, all else equal. Therefore, the foregone optimal search benefits
represent an important and overlooked cost of stare decisis.
This Section applied the optimal search perspective described above to
questions of institutional design. It is generally assumed that current
separation of powers and stare decisis outcomes are viewed as a reasonable
balancing of the checking benefits of separation of powers and stare decisis
against their efficiency costs. This balance, however, excludes the optimal
search perspective. The addition of the optimal search perspective impels
institutional design toward less separation of powers and reduced emphasis on
stare decisis.
The analysis of separation of powers and stare decisis introduced a
consideration deemphasized in the earlier parts of this Article -the possibility
(or inevitability) that public policymakers will not always choose policies that
maximize the common good. The next Part further examines the interplay of
public choice analysis and the optimal search approach.
IV. PUBLIC POLICYMAKING INCENTIVES AND THE OPTIMAL SEARCH
APPROACH
This Article has explored the best policymaking choice for a public
policymaker aiming to maximize long-run social welfare. The discussion has
been normative, concerning how policymakers should choose policy to
maximize long-term social welfare. When reversibility is low, high-variance
policies are the best choice for this policymaker. But what if public
policymakers have other goals, such as maintaining their positions or
maximizing their own wealth? Under these conditions, will high-variance
policies be chosen and will optimal search policies become a cover for policies
that pursue other motives? In addition, are there any mechanisms for realizing
the benefits of optimal search policies in the presence of self-interested public
policymakers?
interpretive methods to implement a variety of different outcomes when interpreting
statutes. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges
and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769 (2008). Thus, even when engaged in statutory
interpretation, judges effectively "choose" policies to a certain degree, though they are
constrained by principles of statutory interpretation.
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This Part analyzes policymakers' incentives to enact high-variance policies.
I will assume that policies are reversible without cost in order to focus on the
role of incentives in optimal search. In addition, I assume that, instead of
maximizing social welfare, public policymakers seek to jointly maximize some
combination of social welfare and their own individual welfare. 172 The
individual welfare of policymakers may be increased through money, lack of
criticism, reelection, and professional advancement. Some of these
considerations will impede the production of high-variance policies via the
optimal search approach while others will enhance such production.
A. High-Variance Policies and Reelection,/Reappointment Incentives
First, consider a public policymaker seeking reelection to a position chosen
by public vote. This policymaker chooses policies designed to convince the
public to vote for her in upcoming elections. Both the public's risk preferences
and the politician's status determine whether optimal search policies are
pursued.
Assume that a successful policy increases reelection probabilities and that a
failed policy decreases such probabilities. Under these conditions, high-
variance/low-expected-value policies will not be chosen by policymakers.
These policies are likely to fail and therefore hurt the policymaker's reelection
chances, in spite of their long-run efficiency. The political process is unlikely to
produce the optimal amount of policy variation for learning. The
underproduction of policy variance will be exacerbated when voters are risk-
averse, such that if given a choice between two portfolios of policies, they will
choose the portfolio with a certain, albeit lower, expected value over a riskier
portfolio with a higher expected value. Furthermore, if voters focus on the
effects of new policies rather than old policies and most of the new policies are
failures, then policymakers will avoid high-variance/low-expected-value
innovation at all costs.
When donations from special interests raise reelection chances, then the
optimal search approach may even provide "cover" for politicians seeking
reelection by currying favor with the special interests. Suppose that
policymakers seeking reelection must weigh the value of money provided by
special interests against the electoral cost of instituting policies that favor the
special interests but harm the average voter. In these conditions, policymakers
may claim that a poor policy designed to favor a special interest is actually a
high-variance optimal search policy. If the public cannot distinguish between
172. The discussion in this Part is influenced by Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1o8.
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special-interest pandering and policies with genuinely high upsides, then the
policymaker can reduce the cost of special-interest pandering. This cover will
raise the amount of special-interest pandering.
This analysis, however, assumes that voters judge each policy simply by
success or failure and are unable to distinguish policies with high upsides from
policies that pander to special interests. If voters value extremely successful
policies more than ordinary successes, and policy failures can be changed, then
a package of high-variance policies may increase reelection chances.
Policymakers can keep the successes, drop the failures, and achieve a net
benefit for the public, increasing reelection chances. Relatedly, policymakers
can educate voters about the benefits of variance. If voters understand the
long-run value of policy change and social welfare is distributed evenly, then
voters will reward policymakers choosing high-variance policies because of
their long-run value. Finally, the cost of special-interest pandering is reduced
with highly reversible policies. A policy may benefit a special interest, but if it is
a failure and reversibility is easy, then such a policy may not last long. If failed
policies benefiting special interests are quickly reversed, then special interests
may have less incentive to pursue policies with no upside that simply benefit
the special interest. Thus, depending upon the preferences of voters and the
ease of reversibility, reelection incentives can either facilitate or impede the
high-variance policies favored under the optimal search approach.
Political risk-taking incentives will also be affected by perceived reelection
probabilities. Politicians expecting to lose future elections may be encouraged
to choose high-variance/low-expected-value policies, because a very successful
policy may enable future election victories while failure just makes already low
approval ratings even lower.'73 While this appears to be a negative consequence
of the "knife-edge" significance of receiving a majority of the vote,' 74 the
optimal search approach demonstrates that such policies may be socially
desirable. Similarly, individuals with no chance of being reelected, such as
politicians facing term limits, may be more likely to choose high-variance
policies as they have "nothing to lose" by pursuing significant policy successes.
A similar analysis applies to appointed policymakers seeking
reappointment. This category includes administrative policymakers whose job
security depends upon the approval of elected officials or judges with fixed
terms subject to reappointment.
173. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risktaking and Electoral Competition, 7 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 527, 527
(1991).
174. Id.
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If reappointment depends upon the preferences of elected policymakers,
then appointed policymakers may internalize the policymaking preferences of
their appointers. In that case, policymaking by appointed policymakers seeking
reappointment will be identical to the policymaking of elected policymakers
discussed above.
In other cases, however, reappointment may depend upon simply avoiding
substantial failures or any negative attention. Most policymakers may get
reappointed, with only conspicuously poor policymakers getting denied
reappointment. Under these conditions, the high-variance policies favored by
the optimal search approach will not be chosen. The policymaker seeks to
minimize the downside risk associated with the policies she chooses rather than
the social welfare of the policies or the learning benefits of variance. High-
variance policies have a higher probability of "failure" and therefore will not be
chosen.
B. High-Variance Policies and Incentives for Political Advancement
While reelection or reappointment incentives will often reduce
policymakers' incentives to choose high-variance policies, the potential for
policymaking advancement may raise the prevalence of high-variance policies.
Because it is difficult to achieve higher office, candidates may be forced to take
risks to attain such office. The risky choices policymakers take, however, will
not always match the choices favored by the optimal search perspective.
Suppose, for simplicity, that all policymakers desire higher elected or
appointed office. For example, there may be many congresspersons who strive
to be elected to the Senate or to executive positions such as state governor or
President. Similarly, there are many district court judges who have ambitions
of a seat on an appeals court or the Supreme Court. Suppose further that the
policymakers achieving higher office are the ones choosing the best policies.
For example, one hundred senators are chosen from 435 representatives by
choosing the one hundred representatives whose policies have produced the
best outcomes.
Consider the incentives of a representative who is seeking advancement and
must select from a set of policies. The representative aims to choose a policy
that is among the one hundred best. To do this, the congressperson must take
risks. If each representative chooses policies that maximize expected value, then
a congressperson has less than a one-in-four chance of attaining the Senate.
High-variance policies, by contrast, may provide a better chance of placing in
the top hundred than expected-value maximization policies. These high-
variance policies may have greater downsides than other policies, but
congresspersons are less interested in the magnitude of the downsides. If a
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policy falls below expectations, the representative is unlikely to advance,
regardless of whether the failure is of small or great proportions. Thus,
ambitions for higher positions may induce politicians to choose high-variance
policies. Indeed, because the magnitude of downside risks plays almost no role
in policy advancement, policymakers may give even less weight to poor
outcomes than they would under the optimal search approach.
The scarcer the office, the greater the risks that will be taken to attain that
office. No representative is likely to find the single most successful policy out of
435 without realizing the high upside of a high-variance policy. If there were
435 representatives for four hundred Senate seats, by contrast, congresspersons
would be likely to become risk-averse, as they would be likely to attain the
Senate so long as they were not associated with a failed policy with an
undesirable downside.
For the most part, however, political hierarchies display a pyramidal shape.
There are many policymakers on one rung competing for the rung above. High
variance should therefore be induced by a government with multiple levels of
hierarchy. Politicians may seek both reelection and advancement. They thus
face conflicting incentives: advancement requires risk taking, while reelection
may discourage risk. In total, the most political risks might be taken by a
politician seeking advancement who has little fear of failing to gain reelection.
The fewest risks will be taken by a politician in a competitive district who has
no ambition for higher office. Because risky policies have high value under the
optimal search perspective, "safe" districts may have greater political value than
commonly believed. 175
When advancement requires appointment by one party and approval by
another, such as appointment to the Supreme Court, risk-taking incentives are
altered. On the one hand, judges aspiring to the Supreme Court must take
enough risks to differentiate themselves from the mass of judges of similar
ideology. If they do not, they are unlikely to get noticed or appointed. On the
other hand, judges must take care to avoid offending the Senate and inducing a
filibuster on their nomination. Given these conflicting incentives, risk-taking
incentives for judges pursuing advancement are uncertain.
175. Cf. Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008) (arguing that
competitive electoral districts are less important than creating conditions of "democratic
contestation"). But see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 646 (1998) ("Only through an
appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic
politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the
interests and views of citizens.").
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C. Federalism and Incentives To Innovate
Subsection II.C.4 demonstrated that the benefits of experimentation
increase in a multi-jurisdictional context, as learning through policy variation
occurs across space as well as across time. Unfortunately, incentives to innovate
in a federal system may be no greater than incentives to innovate in a uni-
jurisdictional system, in spite of the added benefits of such innovation. Several
factors explain why federalism may not generate sufficient useful
experimentation. 176
First, federalism creates a free-rider problem for innovation. A policymaker
in a state will strongly prefer to allow other states to attempt a high-
variance/low-expected-value policy such as Policy B. The policymaker thereby
gains the option value of Policy B without bearing its cost, free-riding on the
efforts of the state that chooses Policy B. If every state hopes to free-ride, no
state will innovate and the benefits of federalism as a laboratory will not be
realized. Indeed, in some cases federalism leads to less innovation than does a
uni-jurisdictional system.77
176. For a thorough examination of the effects of federalism on innovation from a positive
political theory perspective, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note io8.
177. To see this point, consider two jurisdictions that face the choice between Policy A and Policy
B of Example 2. Section II.A demonstrated that in a uni-jurisdictional world, the optimal
search approach dictates that Policy B is the efficient choice. When there are two
jurisdictions, the choice of innovation (Policy B) versus no innovation (Policy A) can be
modeled as the following game:
POLICY A $500, $500 $628, $586
POLICY B $586, $628 $586, $586
The value of $628 in the game modeled above comes from retaining Policy A in the first
period and observing the outcome of Policy B in the other jurisdiction. If Policy B fails in the
other jurisdiction, then continue with Policy A in the second period. If Policy B succeeds in
the other jurisdiction (and is observed), then switch to Policy B in the next period and enjoy
the high upside of Policy B. In other words, one jurisdiction can free-ride off the other
jurisdiction's experimentation with Policy B.
There is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to this game and therefore no unique
solution. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONoMic THEORY 248-50 (1995). Choosing either policy is a rationalizable strategy
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Second, if voters choose their elected officials based on outcomes in that
jurisdiction exclusively, then each elected official will maximize his or her own
jurisdiction's welfare. In these circumstances, the total amount of policy
variance will be inadequate-even if no jurisdiction seeks to free-ride on the
experimentation of another. Consider Policies A and B in Example 3 and
assume that no jurisdiction seeks to free-ride on the experimentation of
another jurisdiction and that no jurisdiction accounts for benefits of policy
variance that accrue to other jurisdictions. Thus, both jurisdictions will treat
the policy choice between Policy A and Policy B as if they were in a uni-
jurisdictional setting. As shown in Subsection II.C.4 .b, both jurisdictions will
therefore choose Policy A, in spite of the fact that Policy B adds to social
welfare.
Third, many laws are subject to network externalities. 17s In a network, the
overall benefits of a good are proportional to the total number of individuals
(the "network") who use the good. A telephone, for example, is worthless if
there is only one telephone, but it is an incredibly useful communication tool
when there are many. Similarly, individuals benefit from familiar laws. Such
laws save individuals the costs of having to learn about peculiarities in the law.
This network effect further reduces the incentive to innovate. If someone
invents a new communication system that is just as good (or even somewhat
better) than the telephone but cannot be used in the current telephone system,
the new system is unlikely to gain traction because the new system has no other
users and no network. Similarly, an innovative law that is just as good as or
slightly better than the existing law is unlikely to be tried because of the costs
of building a new network around the innovative law. For example, a state may
consider a new contract default better than the rule prescribed in the Uniform
Commercial Code but decide that introducing a rule that is different from the
rule of other states might raise costs for companies that do business in that
state and others because they will have to deal with two sets of laws.
Fourth, when externalities or other market failures are a problem,
federalism may not generate appropriate incentives. For example, if pollution
in one state harms individuals in another state, then politicians in the first state
will not have the appropriate incentives to regulate pollution. The individuals
for both jurisdictions, however. Therefore, we can make no definitive predictions about
whether there will be innovation in this simple multi-jurisdictional world. The uni-
jurisdictional world, by contrast, provides innovation using the optimal search approach. In
this example, federalism can decrease innovation, but cannot increase it. When innovation is
less attractive in the uni-jurisdictional world, however, there can be cases where federalism
produces more innovation than does the optimal search approach.
178. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv.
757, 764 (1995).
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in the second state who are harmed by the pollution do not factor into the
reelection prospects of a politician in the first state. Indeed, the presence of
externalities may lead to a "race to the bottom."1 79 If pollution's effects are
largely out of state, then a state that has lax pollution restrictions will attract
more businesses than a state with strict restrictions because the state with lax
restrictions is a cheaper place to do business. To avoid the loss of businesses,
the state with strict restrictions may loosen its pollution restrictions until all
states have the level of pollution restrictions desired by the states with the most
lax attitudes toward pollution.
In total, free-rider problems, failure to internalize benefits to other
jurisdictions from innovation, network externalities, and spillovers may reduce
policy variation in multi-jurisdictional systems to a level far below optimality.
V. IRREVERSIBILITY AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES: APPLICATIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous three Parts dealt with several objections to the choice of high-
variance policies. When policies are irreversible, high-variance/low-expected-
value policies become undesirable. In addition, public choice incentives may
blunt the formulation of high-variance/low-expected-value policies even when
they are desirable. This Part therefore revisits the applications of the optimal
search approach presented above in light of these complications.
A. Reversible Regulations
By assuming reversibility, Example 2 assumed the result. High-
variance/low-expected-value policies are optimal searches when policies are
reversible. Real-life regulations assume a sliding scale of reversibility.
Regulations concerning pollutants with very short atmospheric lives, for
example, will be more reversible than regulations concerning pollutants that
linger. The desirability of high-variance/low-expected-value regulations
depends critically upon where along this reversibility spectrum the regulation
falls. Consequently, the informational value of a policy that would be analyzed
under the OMB's Circular No. A-4 should include an examination of the
potential persistence of a regulation's effects.
179. Corporate law has a longstanding debate about whether state competition for corporate
charters entails a race to the bottom or a race to the top. For important contributions to this
literature, see supra note 73.
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Regulations may also be subject to inertia caused by several factors. Parties
that benefit from a failed regulation may fight harder to keep the regulation
than they would to pass it in the first place due to status quo bias and loss
aversion. s ° In addition, regulators seeking reappointment may avoid any
policy change since such a change may reduce the chances of reappointment by
"rocking the boat."
It should be noted, however, that inertia in regulatory activities should be
lower than in other contexts. Regulators face lower institutional barriers to
changing policy than do other policymaking officials. For example, a new
administration can change regulatory policy far more rapidly than it can
change a statutory policy. In addition, inertia can be limited by enacting a
sunset provision limiting the term of a high-variance/low-expected-value
policy. This enables regulators to maximize the expected gains of learning
through policy variation.
But what of regulators' incentive to innovate? If each regulator controls one
policy, and his or her chances of reappointment depend upon the success of
that policy, he or she will have little incentive to choose high-variance/low-
expected-value policies. This obstacle may prove to be a formidable barrier to
innovation in many contexts.' 8' To increase the incentive to innovate,
individual decisionmakers should have control over several policies. This will
enable them to reap some notable successes from experimentation in addition
to failures. Alternatively, regulatory policymakers might be granted extended
terms to strengthen their incentive to maximize long-term social welfare rather
than career chances.
B. Contract Default Rules and Increased Judicial Policymaking
The levels of irreversibility associated with contract default rule innovations
are primarily associated with information costs. To properly assess the effects
of a rule, contracting parties must know of the rule. Changing a rule therefore
requires informing parties about the change. If the change proves to be a
failure, then the new default rule should be reversed, incurring yet another
18o. See Kahneman et al., supra note 132.
181. Note, however, that there have been several examples of regulatory bodies running
innovative policy experiments, such as the Moving to Opportunity experiment, see Jeffrey R.
Kling, Jens Ludwig & Lawrence F. Katz, Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male
Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, 120 QJ. ECON. 87 (2005),
and the SEC's pilot order restricting short sales of certain securities, see Order Extending
Term of Short Sale Pilot, Exchange Act Release No. 53,684, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,765 (Apr. 20,
2006).
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round of switching costs. The greater these switching costs relative to the long-
run value of a policy, the more reluctant judges should be to choose high-
variance optimal search policies. For example, mergers and acquisitions
lawyers for publicly traded companies should be easier to educate about
changes in contract law than the entire population of lawyers, who in turn are
cheaper to inform than the public at large. As a result, enacting high-variance
default rules on issues covered exclusively by public company transactional
lawyers entails lower irreversible costs than do other contract default rule
changes. All else equal, judges should develop innovative contract default rules
in low cost contexts such as mergers and acquisitions of public companies.
Stare decisis poses another obstacle to the promulgation of new high-
variance default rules. New default rules have higher variance in outcomes than
existing rules, and stare decisis encourages judges to maintain the status quo.
Stare decisis also poses an obstacle to reversing a failed high-variance default
rule. Once the new rule is enacted, it gains precedential effect and is difficult to
reverse. The irreversibility imposed by stare decisis should deter judges from
instituting high-variance/low-expected-value rules, even if judges are willing to
ignore stare decisis on their own account. If future judges adhere to stare
decisis, then a high-variance/low-expected-value policy becomes relatively
irreversible, negating the informational value of such a policy.
Even if stare decisis and learning costs are minor obstacles, judges may
have inadequate incentives to choose high-variance innovative default rules for
a number of reasons. Judges enacting new rules may be less likely to gain
reelection because many of these rules will, on average, lead to bad outcomes,
thereby encouraging voters to unseat the incumbent. Finally, in a multi-
jurisdictional world, a jurisdiction with an innovative and idiosyncratic default
rule loses out on network effects, raising costs for lawyers. Together, these
factors may cause innovation in judicial policymaking to be far below its
optimal level.
Other characteristics of judicial policymaking may counteract the
aforementioned factors that diminish judicial risk taking. Many judges are
appointed for life terms. As a result, they are free to prioritize social welfare
over some other factor, such as reappointment or reelection probabilities.
Because high-variance/low-expected-value policies have such high
informational value, judges may be the best situated candidates to choose such
optimal search policies. In addition, judges may choose high-variance/low-
expected-value policies for selfish reasons, such as notoriety. A decision that
adheres to precedent is unlikely to garner many citations and attention.
Decisions overturning precedent, by contrast, will be instantly controversial. If
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the new policy articulated in a decision proves to be a success, then the judge
has likely established his or her reputation. 82
Sunset clauses for high-variance judicial policies may also have value. Such
sunset clauses -such as the "twenty-five-year window" for affirmative action
articulated by Justice O'Connor in GrutterS3-allow high-risk policies to be
attempted while reducing the risk of irreversibility.
C. Shareholder Power
Shareholder voting policies currently exhibit significant inertia. Even
seemingly minor changes that have been embraced without obvious effect in
nations like Great Britain' 84 - such as allowing a nonbinding shareholder vote
on executive compensation"' -raise significant outcries in the United States.
Whatever the explanation, proponents of the status quo have successfully
derailed significant changes to corporate voting rules, such as shareholder
access to the corporate ballot. Shareholder power has witnessed very little
learning through policy variation.
There are several explanations for the inertia in corporate voting policies in
the face of serious disagreement about effective policy. The holdup is not
structural in nature -the SEC could change shareholder access to the corporate
182. For example, Judge Baron Alderson gained considerable notoriety for instituting an
information-forcing default rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. An interesting avenue for future
research would be to compare life-appointed judges with elected judges to determine
whether electoral incentives promote innovation through variation in private law
rulemaking. One might hypothesize that life-appointed judges, removed from electoral
pressures to avoid negative-expected-value common law rules, are more willing to enact
new legal doctrines with high variance. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections,
1o8 COLUM. L. REv. 265, 324-28 (2008) (describing scholarly support for elected judges'
more innovative or activist approaches and noting that state courts' "common-law
lawmaking powers are broadly respected and [their] decisions are relatively easily reversed
through constitutional amendment or legislative action"). I thank William J. Rinner for
raising this point.
183. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter, the Court noted that it "expect[s]
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today." Id. at 343.
184. Note how international differences can also serve to produce useful variation in laws. One
concern, of course, is that differences between nations are so great that one cannot infer the
effects of a variation in Country X will be similar to the effects of the same variation in
Country Y.
185. See Sourafel Girma, Steve Thompson & Peter W. Wright, Corporate Governance Reforms and
Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence fom the UK, 75 MANCHESTER SCH. 65, 66-67
n.5 (2007).
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ballot simply by issuing such a rule.18 6 Instead, the SEC may prefer to avoid
making any decision on a contentious issue such as shareholder access that has
attracted so much attention. 87 Upsetting the status quo may lead to more
trouble than would any other policy. This may explain the SEC's initial
formulation and subsequent retraction of the shareholder access rule. Another
cause of inertia may be that the lobbying power of those supporting the
shareholder power status quo exceeds the lobbying power of those in favor of
increasing shareholder power. Yet another explanation may simply be that the
SEC views the status quo as having higher expected value than the proposed
changes. Finally, the SEC may prefer to avoid the costs associated with the
switchover to a new voting regime.
None of these explanations is perfectly satisfactory from a normative or
even positive perspective. The SEC's attempt to pass a rule providing
shareholder access to the corporate ballot stirred a maelstrom of controversy, 88
meaning that preserving the status quo failed to insure a quiet life for
regulators. Moreover, avoidance of controversy deserves little to no normative
weight. The asymmetric lobbying power explanation may have significant
positive salience under a Republican administration, but lobbying power
should be accorded little normative weight. The higher expected value for the
status quo claim also fails from a normative perspective. If increasing
shareholder power is easily reversible, then the optimal search approach
demonstrates that the informational value of an innovative increased
shareholder power policy probably trumps the high expected value but lower
variance associated with the status quo. Finally, increasing (or subsequently
decreasing) shareholder power is unlikely to entail prohibitive expenses.
186. See Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: The SEC's Shareholder
Access Proposal (Jan. io, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchoiloosrcc.htm) ("Based on these considerations, I
believe that the [shareholder access] rule is fully within our authority. I am not alone in my
view. Several academics have expressed support for the SEC's authority to adopt the proxy
access rule."). But see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (suggesting
limitations on the SEC's power to regulate substantive aspects of corporate voting).
187. The SEC received over thirty-four thousand comments on the issue. See Nazareth Speech,
supra note loo.
188. See, e.g., Broc Romanek, SEC Quickly Adopts Non-Shareholder Access Rule - Then Fireworks
Ensue, TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog, Nov. 29, 2007,
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/ool638.html ("The real fireworks began
right after the meeting, when all sorts of investor groups, members of Congress, etc. issued
statements disapproving the SEC's rulemaking (eg. CaPERS; CII; RiskMetrics; AFL-CIO;
Rep. Frank; Sen. Dodd) - and some approved (eg. Marty Lipton). It's notable that the
opposition is fairly organized on this issue; I can't imagine something like this happening
even five years ago.").
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Corporate voting primarily concerns two concentrated and experienced
bodies -institutional shareholders and corporate management-who can
cheaply be informed of any rule change. Compared to the purported benefits of
"corporate democracy," the switching costs appear quite low.
Indeed, learning through policy variation by instituting shareholder access
to the corporate ballot offers the possibility of resolving this longstanding
debate. Yet again, a "sunset provision" may offer a compromise that will satisfy
both parties. While management advocates may refuse to accept a rule that
guarantees shareholders access to the corporate ballot for an indefinite period,
they may be willing to allow such access for a short period subject to a sunset
provision. The sunset provision prevents inertia from allowing an inefficient
shareholder access provision to linger. In addition, if shareholder access
produces the parade of horribles that its opponents describe, then a brief
period of shareholder access to the ballot will resolve the debate in favor of the
status quo, conserving on lobbying energy. Conversely, advocates of
shareholder access to the power would almost certainly prefer a limited trial of
their desired policy than continued adherence to the status quo. If shareholder
access proves to be the success its proponents foresee, then they will have a
much stronger argument for reenacting the policy once it expires.
D. Federalism and Preemption
As discussed in Section 1V.C, there exists a mismatch between the value of
policy variance in a federalist context and the production of such variance.
Free-riding and nonvaluation of informational benefits to other jurisdictions
reduce policymakers' incentives to enact high-variance policies relative to the
socially optimal level. In addition, network externalities and other spillovers
reduce the per-period value of policy differentiation between jurisdictions. In
total, it is no surprise that federalism produces relatively few experiments. s9
Preemption doctrines exacerbate the problem. There is no question that by
creating a legal network effect and eliminating spillovers from one
jurisdiction's policy to the next, preemption can improve outcomes in the
current period. As discussed in Subsection II.C..c, however, this increase in
per-period value comes at a significant cost-the elimination of information-
producing policy variance that improves long-run policy outcomes. Because
courts evaluating preemption have typically overlooked this dimension-
learning through policy variation goes unmentioned in the Supreme Court's
preemption test-I advocate looser enforcement of preemption doctrine.
189. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note lo8, at 594.
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Looser enforcement of preemption doctrine, however, does little or nothing
to enhance policymakers' incentives to innovate. Innovative policies produce
informational externalities -all jurisdictions learn from a single jurisdiction's
experience. To encourage jurisdictions to internalize these externalities,
Congress should adopt a system of grants to jurisdictions that enact innovative
policies. 9 ' Grants will increase the incentives for innovation. Policymakers will
weigh the expected benefits of the innovative policy and the value of the grant
associated with the policy against the expected costs of policy innovation.
Grants are no panacea, however.19' Jurisdictions will have an incentive to
claim that they are innovating to seek grants. Once they receive the grant,
however, they will prefer to avoid making the potentially costly innovation.
Without clear parameters regarding what does and does not constitute a policy
innovation, grantmaking offers only a partial solution to the underproduction
of policy variation.
E. Other Sources of Variation: Direct Experimentation
A federal system offers the possibility of learning through the experience of
one jurisdiction without having to impose a high-variance policy on all
jurisdictions. This is not the only way of achieving this goal, however. Policy
variation can be produced at many different levels, such as the local, firm, or
individual level. Drug trials, for example, induce variation in medication at the
individual level; some participants in a drug trial receive one medication and
some receive another. By experimenting on a small group of people and
creating variance among them, drug experiments avoid the cost of
experimenting on all individuals for some period.
Although they seldom do so today, policymakers can produce similar
variation in public policies and learn from such variation. For example, instead
of passing a rule granting shareholder access to the corporate ballot for a
certain period to learn about the effects of such access, the SEC could randomly
assign some companies to a shareholder access regime while allowing other
companies to continue to prevent shareholder access. 9 After observing the
19o. See id. at 615-16.
191. See id. at 616.
192. While random assignment may appear draconian, note that the SEC has randomly assigned
corporations to different short-sale restriction regimes. See Order Extending Term of Short
Sale Pilot, Exchange Act Release No. 53,684, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,765 (Apr. 20, 2006); SEC
OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS
UNDER THE REGULATION SHO PILOT (2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/
regshopiloto2o6o7.pdf.
118:48o 2008
LEARNING THROUGH POLICY VARIATION
effects of this policy variation for a certain period, the SEC would possess
much greater information about the true effects of policy variance. In a related
paper, Ian Ayres and I thoroughly analyze the promise and pitfalls of
randomized public policy experiments, which are yet another means of
learning through policy variation.'93 It should be emphasized, however, that
current learning about the effects of policy occurs through policy change on all
units within a jurisdiction rather than experimental assignment of policy
variation to some subjects and not others.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers several contributions to theories of public policymaking.
First, the Article emphasized that policies are not static and that this dynamism
changes the policymaking calculus. In particular, policymakers should adopt
the optimal search approach, which favors policies with higher variance (other
things equal), whenever policies are reversible at low cost. This variance-
preferring perspective has received little if any attention from scholars of
policymaking, who generally debate whether policymaking should aim to
maximize the average value of a policy or to take a risk-averse, Burkean
approach.
Next, the Article expanded the dynamic policymaking context to include
irreversible policies. When new policies cannot be changed and learning is
possible, the policy calculus alters dramatically. Policymaking should become
cautious to retain flexibility under the real options approach-a theoretical
complement to the optimal search approach. When policies are partially
reversible, then the flexibility benefits of the real options approach and the
learning benefits offset each other, making a naive expected-value
maximization approach surprisingly attractive for previously unrecognized
reasons. In sum, the best policy choice in the face of uncertain outcomes
depends critically on the reversibility of the policy. Because some irreversibility
is the deliberate outcome of institutional structures such as separation of
powers, the optimal search approach demonstrates an underanalyzed cost of
these designs -the prevention of policy improvement through learning from
policy variation.
193. See Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
